

Salary Dispersions and other Controversial Aspects to the Discussion on Teaching Career in Brazil

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Abstract

This article presents data on the remuneration of basic education teachers in countries that belong to the Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) and to 12 Brazilian states and their capitals. It was found that there is proximity between the average salary dispersions regarding teachers without a college level both in Brazilian capitals (67%) and states (54%) and data presented in the OECD (60%) and the European Union (55%), mainly concerning teachers who work in primary education. The difference between the salary and remuneration stated in the Brazilian research also found parallel with the OECD data. In the Brazilian case, except for one State, where the form of payment to teachers "include" and "extinguish" all fixed and variable benefits that once existed, in the other networks, besides the salaries, there are a variety of bonuses, bounties, premiums, benefits, among others.

Keywords: Teacher's career, teacher valorization, teacher's salary in Brazil, Teacher's salary in OECD countries, salary dispersion.

1. Introduction

This article is one among many productions undertaken by the National Research "Salary of public school teachers in basic education: settings, impacts, dilemmas and perspective", funded under the Public Notice no. 001/2008 CAPES / INEP / SECAD – Observatory for Education. The research was coordinated by the Centre for Studies and Research in Public Policy on Education (CEPPPE), of Faculdade de Educação da Universidade de São Paulo and was performed in 12 states (São Paulo, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, Paraíba, Piauí, Roraima, Pará, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Norte), involving nine Postgraduate Education Programs (USP, UFPA, UFPI, UFPB, UFRN, UEMG, UFMS, UFPR, UNISUL), and four research groups collaborators (USP-RP, UNIFESP, UFMT, UFRGS), over four years, from 2009 to 2012. In the survey, teacher's salaries in state public networks and municipal networks from their capitals was investigated considering the settings, impacts, dilemmas and perspective of teacher's appreciation in the period 1996-2010. Between 2009 and 2012, the Piso Salarial Profissional Nacional (PSPN) implementation in Brazil National and many states and municipalities reformulated the Planos de Cargos, Carreira e Remuneração (PCCR) of basic's teachers. Therefore, we believe that it is still necessary to raise more information as well as consolidate a deep reflection about all factors involved in the improvement of new policies that will shape the new conditions of teachers' work in the Brazilian public sector. To better understand the teacher remuneration – commonly referred to as "teacher salary" – it is necessary to establish some preliminary definitions. In accordance with the law of positions, careers and teacher's remuneration in the states and their capitals that take part in this study, teacher's remuneration consists of the salary or base salary, supplemented with different permanent and transitory monetary rewards.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is understood as salary or basic salary the pecuniary compensation for the exercise of a public post, with provision through public concourse. In general, the salary ranges are described in standards, in a two-way table, which lists the functional framework and the position occupied by the government employee, by virtue of his career development called, among other expressions, evolution, progression and promotion. The movement occurs in any direction, vertical or horizontal. In other words, the salary is described in a table of financial values associated with the position and the framework of government employee in a particular administrative class of the public service. Base salary, as a rule, is a legal reference to the contract and acting in a public service, formal mechanism that supports the employment of teachers on a temporary way in most networks. Sometimes, in the different networks, the value of the base salary and the value of basic pay may be coincidental, but it is the latter that are added fixed or permanent advantages of the teacher's post. With regard to teacher's salary, it is important to highlight that it is defined by each administrative level in accordance with current educational policies. In other words, the salary is embedded, among other factors, with the politicise of the governments; with the political strength of organized education workers; with the dimensions, characteristics and responsibilities of the local educational services; with the ability to collect local budgetary and financial execution; as well as the allocation of budgetary resources that constitute the whole range of spending on education.

For the study of the composition of the teacher's salary, additional factors interfere in defining the payment of the education staff due to its parameter settings, via enforcement policies of public financial resources in the short, medium or long term. On one hand, it can be considered as a short or medium term policy adoption, for a brief period, a temporary stipend in the form of bonuses, additional, award, among other names which seeks to account for temporary problems, lack of financial recourses, lack of planning costs, avoid impacts of pension or even unwillingness to meet labour demands. On the other hand, is understood as a long-term policy in statutes or statutory demarcation Career Plans Jobs and Careers in the rights that are set, the scales of salaries, benefits, permanent and transitory advantages among other things, aimed at maintenance of gazetted professionals through a growing salary in their schools because of their work.

Unfortunately, in our country, such remuneration policies often coexist and, in addition, the interim agreements often become permanent. The composition of remuneration is not only a highly complex issue for the management of public networks, but also for teachers understanding of their own remuneration. When confronted with proof of payment (pay stub or pay check) at the end of the month, teachers note the existence of unknown acronyms, definitions, messages, identifiers of different natures, payment or discount codes – mostly related to financial amounts at rock bottom – among other information, that are mainly incomprehensible. The complexity of document directs attention to the "final amount", in other words, to the total of money that will end in the teachers' current account, allowing them to survive. This article begins by presenting some data and information from the annual report *Education at a Glance 2012*, by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), about salaries, its composition, the periods of working experience and the requirements to reach the top remuneration, apart from other information about teaching conditions in various countries around the world; then it presents data and information on the Dimension of Study Plans of Teaching Careers of Basic Education, by the national research and an analysis of the main features of the PCCR, or similar legislation (statutes, regulations etc.) in the 12 states and their capitals that take part on the research, based on the law regulation in each state, and in particular those relating to the dispersion of the base salary; at the end of the article we seek to perform a comparative exercise between some data and research information from the OECD report.

2. Values and teachers 'wage dispersions in OECD countries - brief remarks for a discussion on teaching career

In an attempt to compare teachers' wage dispersions in different countries, we have used the Annual Report of the OECD data of Education at a Glance 2012, which raises important elements for our analysis. Some data and other information are calculated and presented in Table 1.

Table 1 - Statutory annual wages (annual income) of public institutions' teachers with training/minimal training and percentage of dispersion in OECD countries - the base year 2010 (US \$ PPP).

Country	Primary School (Initial Salary)	Primary School (Salary dispersion) (%)	Secondary School (Initial Salary)	Secondary School Salary dispersion (%)	High School (Initial Salary)	High School Salary dispersion (%)	Total dispersion* (%)	Years to reach the top salaries (Secondary School)
Australia	34.193	39	34.321	38	34.321	38	39	9
Austria	30.812	98	32.236	97	32.680	103	121	34
Belgium (FL)	31.193	73	31.193	73	38.939	75	119	27
Belgium (FR)	30.202	74	30.202	74	37.736	77	121	27
Canada	34.443	60	34.443	60	34.588	60	61	11
Chile	17.820	73	17.820	73	17.941	82	84	30
Czech Rep.	15.036	48	14.916	51	15.533	55	61	32
Denmark	43.393	16	43.393	16	44.640	31	35	8
United Kingdom	30.204	46	30.204	46	30.204	46	47	12
Estonia	11.876	46	11.876	46	11.876	46	47	7
Finland	29.029	37	31.351	37	32.276	41	57	20
France	24.334	98	27.184	89	27.420	88	112	34
Germany	46.456	32	51.058	34	53.963	42	65	28
Greece	26.583	46	26.583	46	26.583	46	47	33
Hungary	10.701	65	10.701	65	11.755	95	115	40
Iceland	24.822	17	24.822	17	22.850	29	19	18
Ireland	32.601	86	32.601	86	32.601	86	87	22
Israel	17.646	105	17.646	88	13.995	125	79	36
Italy	27.015	47	29.122	50	29.122	57	69	35
Japan	25.454	122	25.454	122	25.454	124	129	34
South Korea	26.776	177	26.670	178	26.670	178	177	37
Luxembourg	65.171	76	73.777	74	73.777	74	97	30
Mexico	14.302	114	18.446	112	14
Netherlands	36.861	46	38.001	75	38.001	75	81	16
Norway	32.629	24	32.629	24	35991	19	31	16
Poland	9.526	66	10.725	68	12.119	70	117	10
Portugal	30.825	76	30.825	76	30.825	76	76	34
Scotland	30.207	60	30.207	60	30.207	60	60	6
Slovak Rep.	11.028	24	11.028	24	11.028	24	24	32
Slovenia	26.690	28	26.690	28	26.690	28	28	13
Spain	37.137	40	41.518	40	42.325	40	60	38
Sweden	28.937	34	29.245	33	30.650	36	44	...
Switzerland	45.226	57	51.240	55	59107	53	100	27
Turkey	23.130	15	23780	15	18	...
USA	36.858	41	36.772	50	37.267	48	50	...
OECD average	28.523	60	29.801	62	30.899	63	75	24
EU21	28.948	55	30.202	56	31.346	60	74	24

Source: Authors based on OECD data, Education at a Glance, 2012. (...) without data.

* Total dispersion corresponds to the difference between upper pay range and the initial salaries.

The column 1 of Table 1 presents countries selected by the OECD. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the annual values of the starting salaries of primary school teachers with training or minimal training required (here equivalent to working with the initial series of the Brazilian Basic Education), the initial secondary school grades (equivalent to the final years of primary school) and the final years of secondary education (equivalent to high school) public networks in each country in 2010, in US \$ PPP¹. Columns 3, 5 and 7, present teachers' wage dispersions in primary schools, early years of secondary education and final years of secondary education, respectively. Column 8 is presents the total dispersion – the percentage difference between the top and the initial salaries of the teachers with minimum training – regardless of the working level. In the last column it is shown, for every country, amount of years needed for early high school teachers to reach the top salary. The original document specifies that in some countries the exceeding amounts may correspond to the initial salary date or the initial remuneration of teachers in each country (in different years), but for this study it will be considered the statutory salaries presented only as the teachers' salaries. In the publication, there is an initial salary for each teacher's performance level (with training or minimum required training), a value after 10 years of work, after 15 years and a value of the top teaching salary in their grade level, stating that for every performance level there is a level of dispersion in time, in other words, there is a teaching career. The calculation of the dispersion presented here refers to the percentage difference between the final and the initial salaries at each level of the teacher's performance.

Table 1, for primary education teachers, there is a variation between US\$ 9,526 PPP in Poland and US \$ 65,171 PPP in Luxembourg, i.e., a difference of nearly seven (7) times between the initial salary of the two countries. Table 1 also shows that the higher the salaries, the higher the level of education in which teachers work. The OECD average salaries of secondary education lower grades teachers is US \$ 29,801 PPP, while the average of those working in primary education is US\$ 28,523 PPP, a difference of US\$ 1,278 PPP. It is also notable that for equivalent work to our early grades of elementary school dispersion salaries ranged from the lowest value (16% and 15%) in Denmark and Turkey to the highest (177%) in South Korea. There are 17 countries in which this dispersion is less than 50%. The very simple OECD average of dispersion is 60% and in the 21 European Union countries it is 55%. There are only six (6) countries with this level of dispersion with percentages below 30%, while the remaining 12 are between 31% and 49%.

Concerning the percentage wage dispersion of teachers working in initial secondary education, there is also a swing from 16% in Denmark to 178% in South Korea. In addition, the number of countries with dispersion equal to or greater than 50% increases to 21 and decreases to 5 the number of countries with less than 30%, while the other 8 vary between 31% and 49%. For teachers who work at this level it seems to have a strong proximity between the values of these dispersions with those in the primary level, ie, the difference is less than 3%; only France, with 15%; Luxembourg, with 44%, the Netherlands, with 22% and USA with 9%, present variations above this percentage. This may indicate that the countries expect the same "effort" from teachers in order to progress in their careers, whether working in primary or early secondary level. For this level of education, the OECD and 21 European countries averages were 62% and 56%, respectively. As for the percentage of dispersion compensation of teachers working in the final stage of secondary education, the document presents the following pattern: the lowest percentage dispersion is found in Turkey (15%), while the greater dispersion still perceived in South Korea, with 178 %. There are 19 countries with a percentage above 50% dispersion, while also five (5) countries with less than 30% dispersion. The OECD average is 63% and the 21 countries of the European Union average is 60%. On average, there is an increase of both the salaries and also the dispersion percentage in relation to the receipt of teachers who work in the second part of secondary education. Finally, with regard to the total percentage wage dispersion, in other words, the percentage difference between the lowest practiced statutory salary (usually between teachers who work in the early grades of elementary school) and the greatest in different countries (usually, those who work in high school). we perceived the following situation: the dispersion variation is between 19% and 18% in Iceland and Turkey, and 177% in South Korea; we also noticed an overall percentage increase in Table 1.

¹ The \$ PPP (dollar purchasing power) is an economic indicator, created by the OECD, which allows you to compare the purchasing power of a basket of common items to all countries, equivalent to US \$ 100.00 in the US.

Once the OECD average is 75% and the European Union, 74%, well above that average practiced in each level of education, which were around 60%. In addition to these data, Table 1 shows the amount of time that middle school teachers take to reach the top salaries, with a dimension of career prospects. Although not presented in the document, we assume that there is also a career plan for other levels. In this sense, there is an extreme variation between the countries, as in Scotland it takes six years, while in Hungary it takes 40 years. Only in seven countries, which are Australia, Canada, Denmark, United Kingdom, Estonia, Poland and Scotland, the time needed to reach the top salary is equal to or less than 12 years. The reasons for such a short period of time to reach the "top salaries" could be: to be an attractive career for young people interested in working as teachers (five countries where the initial salaries exceed \$ 30,000 annually); the possibility of a more collaborative work between teachers, because there wouldn't be many salary differences among colleagues (there are four countries in which the dispersion does not reach 50%, in the arithmetic average 58%). Moreover, this amount of time exceeds 27 years in 18 countries, which may indicate a greater medium dispersion (usually in countries where the time to reach the top exceeds 27 years the average dispersion is 87% or more) and such "difference" would also be responsible for maintaining the professional teachers in the hope of reaching the top salaries. The others (only 7) are between 13 and 24 years (with asp read average of 51%). The average time to reach the top salaries for OECD and the 21 countries in Europe is 24 years.

In the same document Education at a Glance 2012 there are other relevant information about the teaching profession. One concerns about the difference between average teachers' salaries and other workers' salaries (same age) with tertiary education (which is also required for teachers). In the OECD, there are 12 countries (30 informed) in which the average teachers' salaries are higher than the average of other professions, taking as an example: Luxembourg, Canada, Spain, Portugal, UK and Korea. In Finland, New Zealand and Germany the average salary is very close. In other countries, from the other hand, the average wage among full-time teachers (25 to 64) is always lower (in some it is less than or equal to 50%, as in the Slovak Republic and Iceland). On average, among the teachers who work at primary level, their wages correspond to 82% of other workers' wages with tertiary education; this difference goes to 85% among teachers working at the beginning of the secondary and 90% among those who work at the end of the secondary (OECD, 2012, p.456). Between 2000 and 2010 there was an increase on teachers' wages in the OECD countries and now it has been facing a lot of turbulence because of the economic crisis in 2008 and 2009, but according to the report "there are notable exceptions such as France and Japan where real wages have been declining over the period." (OECD, 2012, p. 457).

The statutory salaries correspond to the components of teachers' total remuneration. There are bonuses, benefits and rewards to those who seek for better qualification (education or training) or who teach in remote areas or "in disadvantaged schools, particularly those located in very poor neighbourhoods or those with a large proportion of students whose language is not the language of instruction. These schools often have difficulty in attracting teachers and are more likely to have less experienced teachers (OECD, 2005)". (OECD, 2012, p. 460) Eleven countries offer additional payment for those who teach in certain areas where there is a shortage of teachers. There is also a reduction of transmission tariffs, benefits in payment of taxes that may be the total teacher compensation. In addition to pay in their salary scales, education systems increasingly resort to using additional payment schemes or other rewards for teachers. These can take the form of financial compensation and / or reducing the number of class hours. Greece and Iceland, for example, offer a reduction of class hours as necessary to reward experience or long service in their networks. In Portugal, teachers may receive a salary increase and a reduction in time to teaching when they perform tasks or special activities, such as teacher training students [teaching interns] or providing guidance or advice. Together with the starting salary, these payments may influence the decision of a person to enter or remain in the teaching profession. Additional payments at the beginning of a career may include allowances and family bonuses to work in certain locations and higher starting salaries for those who have higher education qualifications to a minimum. (OECD, 2012, p. 459) The values of the remuneration, on average in the OECD, on the scale of salaries with minimal qualifications (corresponding to the tertiary level for all OECD) can reach 68% in pre-primary education, 70% in primary education, 74% the initial secondary education and 71% when it reaches the highest level of qualifications at the end of secondary school (but in Mexico, for example, this difference may exceed 224%) (2012, Table D3.4 - Web only²). Half of the OECD researched countries (38 countries) have been practicing various payment strategies based on performance and in most of them the decision on the receipt is on the school units.

²www.oecd.org/edu/eag2012.

One must also consider that even presented as a career, not all teachers reach the top of the salary scale. "For example, in Italy, less than 5% of all teachers reached the top of the salary scale in 2010." (OECD, 2012, p. 460) All these perceptions are important when we try to understand the changes that occur in the dispersions in our public networks, as allow us to compare and place Brazil with what is happening in other parts of the world.

3. Dispersion of salaries for training and comparisons with PSPN

When analyzing different Career Plans across Brazil it was found the use of different nomenclatures to indicate both the horizontal movement and the vertical movement across the career. Terms such as promotion, progression and functional evolution may have different meanings when comparing the laws of public networks. In addition, values and percentages that distinguish the salaries between the "levels", "classes" or "references" are also quite variable. To compare these differences, we consider the percentage of wage dispersion, which means "the distance between the lowest and the highest remuneration that correspond respectively to the beginning and end of career of a particular category." (DUTRA JR, et. al., 2000, p. 131) Table 2 shows the dispersion at maturity according to the academic and the total dispersion which considers the difference between the starting salary with the minimum qualification (training on average) and the final maturity with the highest qualification (professor with a doctorate or higher titration provided for in PCCR) of salary scales. This analysis shows both career progressions for each level of training as one in which the teacher changes the level of training throughout their career.

Table 2 - Percentage dispersion between the Initial and Final Salary, according to academic formation and total in career

State/Capital	Salary Dispersion				Years to reach the top of the career
	EM	ES	PG	Total	
Roraima	20%	20%	0%	228%	13
Boa Vista	98%	98%	98%	189	31
Pará	64%	25%	26%	163	23
Belém	66%	52%	48%	100%	26
Rio Grande do Norte	55%	55%	55%	257%	23
Natal	98%	98%	98%	220%	32
Piauí	6%	9%	30%	164%	27
Teresina	28%	116%	-	164%	33
Paraíba	30%	30%	30%	76%	38
João pessoa	23%	23%	23%	253%	25
Mato Grosso	59%	59%	59%	266%	36
Cuiabá	60%	60%	60%	174%	38
Mato Grosso do Sul	61%	61%	61%	166%	27
Campo Grande	84%	84%	84%	259%	27
Minas Gerais	51%	51%	51%	309%	30
Belo Horizonte	48%	98%	62%	98%	27
São Paulo (State)	143%	110%	100%	181%	27
São Paulo (Capital)	100%	100%	-	141%	22
Paraná	63%	63%	63%	398%	22
Curitiba	105%	298%	471%	656%	19
Santa Catarina	39%	39%	39%	188%	24
Florianópolis	61%	65%	70%	238%	27
Rio Grande do Sul	50%	50%	50%	200%	30
Porto Alegre	75%	75%	75%	218%	18

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of current salary tables in 2010, in the states and capitals. Legend: EM - training for middle level; ES - college degree - Full Degree; PG - postgraduate (specialization, master's or doctorate).

Obs: In PG column used the salary of the doctor teacher or the highest degree contemplated in the career plan. The dispersion of the salary among teachers with training in middle level - normal mode varies from 6% (Piauí) to 143% (São Paulo - State)³. A very low dispersion as in the case of Piauí may indicate little appeal in relation to career, unless the starting salary is competitive with other professions that require the same training, which could denote intentions from the departments of education in attracting younger people to the teaching profession. However, that seems to be the case of Piauí, which basic salary in 2010 for a journey of 40 hours per week was R\$ 1.024,68, (US\$ 737,25 PPP) i.e. corresponding to the Piso Salarial Profissional Nacional (PSPN) of the year. Dispersion just like São Paulo (state) of 143% and São Paulo (Capital) 100%; Curitiba, 105%; Boa Vista, 98% and Natal, 98% may present an effort to maintain professional career, since it is possible to double the basic salary upon reaching the maximum value, without changing the initial training required. Only four states have a lower dispersion of 39% at this level of training (Roraima, Piauí, Paraíba and Santa Catarina) and the capital cities: Teresina and João Pessoa, that correspond to 28% and 23%, respectively.

One may consider the need of combining a starting salary that is minimally competitive in comparison with other professions, which has not occurred in Brazil (ALVES; PINTO, 2011) and a career that presents an encouraging salary dispersion to avoid teachers' evasion from the teaching career. With regards to salary dispersion among teachers with college degree, it is perceived that ranges from 9% (Piauí) to 298% (Curitiba). For teachers with training, according to salary tables, there is the same dispersion tendency observed for teachers with a high school education in Normal Modality, except for Teresina (116%) and Curitiba (298%). As examples of a greater differentiation we have Pará (25%), Belém (52%), Piauí (9%) and São Paulo (110%). These dispersions may represent similar structure careers with isonomic characteristics between teachers with different initial training, that is, it gives the impression of the necessity for the same teaching "effort" (in terms of time and required certifications) among teachers with middle-level training and higher level. In addition, it is understood that the smaller this dispersion is, the smaller would be the stimulus for public school teachers with this formation to remain in the condition of licence, or it could even decrease the career appeal for beginners, depending on the values of the initial salaries in each system (state or municipal). At Teresina (116%), São Paulo (State Capital, 110% and 100%, respectively), Boa Vista (98%), Belém (98%), Belo Horizonte (98%) and Curitiba (298%) where there is a high dispersion, one can understand that there are greater incentives to maintain network of teachers with college degree. The observations previously made about a low value of initial basic salary can also be considered in this context.

With regard to post-graduate training, most states and capitals have the same dispersion percentage seen in the secondary and high school education, especially at in the city of São Paulo, where there is no dispersion in the case of post-graduation, because every teacher who has a degree can reach the career end without necessarily having a post-graduation course. In Teresina, the teacher who has post-graduation level will have a basic salary increase of 7.5% (specialization), 15% (Master) and 30% (PhD) as gratification. In Roraima (0%) there is no dispersion because there is a unique level in the special career class which corresponds to the doctorate. The scenario at Curitiba (471%) should be carefully analyzed once the dispersion presents in the table and incorporates the different changes in the career plan that computes 75 years for the teacher to reach the career end (considered in this study as "amplitude career," that is, how long it would take for a teacher to reach the final salary). Due to this peculiar scenario, we cannot consider this dispersion as it has been considered in relation to other states and capitals. It is worth mentioning that in the states of Pará and Belém there is no difference between initial and final basis salary, because the degree, continuous education and length of service are paid as bonuses. Thus, the percentages presented in Table 2 refer to the dispersion compensation. Interestingly, in these two cases there is no career development on the basic salary's point of view, indicating a different design compared to the careers in other states and capitals. This way of structuring the career can compromise the remuneration of teachers wage increases (replacement of inflation or real increase) is not also granted to his basic salary and bonuses.

³ The calculations for São Paulo - State are to Professor of Basic Education I, that is, teachers who work in the early years of elementary school. In the case of Professor of Basic Education II, those who work in the final years of elementary school and in high school, while the dispersion of the basic salary for both those with higher education and for those who have graduate is the same as for the teacher with training in medium level (143% and 100%), the initial salary are different, that is, there is a difference in earnings by educational level in which the teacher works.

The total dispersion career, that is, the variation between the original salary of teaching early-stage and mid-level training in Normal Modality, and the final salary of the teacher at the end of the career and in the last position (achieving it by titration or other form of drive), it's possible to verify that, apart from Paraíba (76%), the total dispersion exceeds 100%, which probably means that if the basic education teachers have a post-graduate course and are at the end of the career scale, they will have a significantly higher salary when compared to those who have a college degree and are licensed and especially than those who only have mid-level formation in Normal School Modality. The average dispersion rates in states and capitals for each level of the teaching career scale are presented in Table 3.

Table 3 Average percentage of dispersion by states and capitals of the sample

	Salary Dispersion			
	EM	ES	PG	Total
Average percentage – States	54%	52%	48%	215%
Average percentage – Capitals	67%	99%	93%	238%

Source: Authors based on Table 2

One can notice that the average percentage of dispersion in states is lower than in capitals in all teacher training tracks and even in total dispersion. While the average in states in each training level goes between 48% and 54% in capital such it varies between 67% and 99%. The average percentage of total dispersion in the states reaches 215% while in the capitals it reaches 238%. This seems to reveal that capitals' PCCRs are more attractive to keep teachers in their networks than the states' PCCRs, due to larger average dispersion values in every teacher training range. This can be even more noticeable when combined with the teaching careers' initial salaries for each local level, as can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4 - Working Hours, Base Salary, initial time-class values in R\$ and US\$ PPP – 2010

State/Capital	Weekly Working Hours	Monthly Initial Salary (R\$ at 2010)	Initial time-class value (R\$ at 2010)	Monthly Initial Salary (US\$ PPP - OCDE at 2010)	Initial time-class value (US\$ PPP - OCDE at 2010)	Annual Salary Initial (US\$ PPP - OCDE at 2010) *
Roraima	25	1.339,37	10,71	963,58	7,71	9.219,82
Boa Vista	25	1.454,55	11,64	1.046,44	8,37	10.012,69
Pará	20	697,69	6,64	501,94	4,78	4.802,69
Belém	20	979,20	9,79	704,46	7,04	6.740,52
Rio Grande do Norte	30	620,00	4,13	446,04	2,97	4.267,90
Natal	40	1.543,51	7,72	1.110,44	5,55	10.625,06
Piauí	40	1.024,68	5,12	737,18	3,68	7.053,59
Teresina	40	1.024,70	5,12	737,19	3,68	7.053,73
Paraíba	30	661,55	4,41	475,94	3,17	4.553,91
João Pessoa	30	693,25	4,62	498,74	3,32	4.772,13
Mato Grosso	30	1.135,16	7,57	816,66	5,45	7.814,10
Cuiabá	40	1.690,83	8,45	1.216,42	6,08	11.639,17
Mato Grosso do Sul	40	1.250,87	6,25	899,91	4,50	8.610,62
Campo Grande	40	1.864,25	9,32	1.341,19	6,71	12.832,94
Minas Gerais	24	336,26	2,80	241,91	2,01	2.314,71
Belo Horizonte	20	969,00	9,69	697,12	6,97	6.670,31
São Paulo (State)	40	1.368,75	6,84	984,71	4,92	9.422,07
São Paulo (Capital)	30	1.418,22	9,45	1.020,30	6,80	9.762,60
Paraná	20	542,39	5,42	390,21	3,90	3.733,65
Curitiba	20	743,32	7,43	534,76	5,35	5.116,79
Santa Catarina	40	609,46	3,05	438,46	2,19	4.195,34
Florianópolis	20	484,18	4,84	348,33	3,48	3.332,95
Rio Grande do Sul	20	386,62	3,87	278,14	2,78	2.661,38
Porto Alegre	20	962,10	9,62	692,16	6,92	6.622,81

* The annual salary calculations were made by multiplying the monthly value by 13.3 (12 months, 13rd salary and 0.3 vacation).

Source: Prepared by the authors based on current salary tables of 2010, in the states and capitals.

The Salary corresponds to teacher with training in middle level. If considered as initial salary, the value of the PSPN in 2010 equals to R\$ 1.024.67 (US\$ 737,25 PPP) for a 40-hour shift per week, five weeks in a month, the minimum amount to be paid by the “worked hour of class” would be R\$ 5.12 or US\$ 3,68 PPP. Based on this reference number, it is noticeable that the states of Minas Gerais (R\$ 2,80 or US\$, 2,01 PPP), Santa Catarina (R\$ 3,05 or US\$ 2,19 PPP), Rio Grande do Sul (R\$ 3,87 or US\$ 2,78 PPP), Rio Grande do Norte (R\$ 4,13 or US\$ 2,97 PPP) and Paraíba (R\$ 4,41 or US\$ 3,17 PPP) and the capitals João Pessoa (R\$ 4,62 or US\$ 3,32 PPP) and Florianópolis (R\$ 4,84 or US\$ 3,48 PPP) gave the teachers (with high school education level in the Normal Modality and with early career experience), in terms of basic salary of one “worked hour class” hour-class value less than the value determined by the class hour national level. The state of Piauí and its capital, Teresina, were the only ones that established the value of the class hour floor itself for the payment of the basic salary in terms of class hour, in 2010. The states of Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, São Paulo and Mato Grosso and the cities Curitiba, Natal, Cuiabá, Campo Grande, São Paulo, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte and Belém present value of earnings per class hour above the PSPN, between R\$ 5,42 (US\$ 3,90 PPP) and R\$ 9,79 (US\$ 7,04 PPP). Only Rorem and its capital, Boa Vista, exceed the PSPN, respectively paying R\$ 10,71 (US\$ 7,71 PPP) and R\$ 11,64 (US\$ 8,37 PPP) for the hour-class, in terms of initial basic salary. Based on a simple arithmetic average the capital of the sample paid R\$ 8.14 (US\$ 5,86 PPP) per class hour while the sample states had paid R\$ 5.60 (US\$ 4,03 PPP), in 2010. This information can be used to confirm the idea that the capital not only have a greater dispersion to keep teachers in their networks, but also have an average class hour value 45% higher than the state networks, allowing them to attract more and best qualified teachers.

4. Comparative exercise between data and national and international information

Although it is not possible to do a mechanical analysis of the salaries’ dispersion in the Brazilian sample of 2010 presented in Tables 2 and 3, as well as the educational level of teachers’ performance, a reasonable hypothesis is to link teachers from the Normal Modality of high school to those working in the early grades of elementary school; and those with college degree and/or graduate working in the final grades of elementary school or high school. Thus, it is possible to carry out a comparative exercise based on the data presented by the OECD report. In this exercise, it is possible to see the proximity between the percentage of the average teachers' salaries in the dispersions and the average level of training in the capital and the states 67% and 54%, respectively, and the information presented by the OECD (60%) and the EU (55%) for teachers working in primary education, in 2010. When comparing the possible reasons for the teachers’ salaries’ dispersions in the capital and in the states for teachers with Bachelor (perhaps corresponding to tertiary education of minimum qualification in the OECD study criteria), main values of 99% for capital, which means that local governments are far from the average of OECD and EU, which are 62% and 56%, for teachers working in initial secondary, while networks next state have an average dispersion of 52%. The same is true when considering the average dispersion of teachers’ salaries to graduate because we found an average of 93% in capital and 48% in the states when comparing with the OECD’s final step of secondary level, which is 63% and 60% in the EU.

In the case of the total percentage dispersion, it’s possible to verify much higher values in the survey sample of Brazil (remembering that these are relative values of teacher training) than for the teaching levels of the OECD and EU teachers, with orders of very different magnitude. In Brazil, the average dispersion is around 220%, while the OECD and the EU average is approximately 75%, although we found some countries with values close to 180%, such as Korea and other revolving of 120%, as Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Japan and Poland. Probably this large difference is due to, on one hand, the smallest baseline salaries in the different networks in our country and, on the other hand, the small possibilities to reach the highest values of corresponding maturities in PCCRs, as also mentioned in the text “Education at a glance - 2012”. In our research we also found other similar situations to those presented in the text of the OECD, standing out in particular the one which qualifies the difference between the salaries and wages. Apart from the State of Mato Grosso, where there are subsidies, which is a form of payment that embodies and extinguishes all fixed and variable benefits that exist in other networks in addition to salaries (which are arranged in a scale that reflects the teacher's position in the career and provides its correspondent wage) there are a number of bonuses, awards, benefits and other terms that may be either fixed benefits (those that are taken into consideration for retirement) or variable advantages (that teachers receive under certain circumstances), and these can have a fixed value or may be proportional to the salary received by each teacher.

As an example we have that, between fixed advantages there are the temporary basis, known as bonuses or additional long service as a public servant such as: anuénios, biennia, three-year periods and five-year periods; between the variable advantages there are a whole range of additional, bonuses and related benefits, such as the performance for night work, schools located in difficult access areas, schools in rural areas, productivity, performance, transportation allowance, meal allowances etc. (which the teachers stop receiving if they lose the condition that gave them this right). These types of advantages can shape more than one hundred codes for teachers' payment and have quite different values (which leads to a complete ignorance on how payments are configured for teachers) that when added to salaries may provide major differences between total compensation and base salaries defined in the career plans. In common language in the area of education, such items constitute what is pejoratively called as "trinkets". However, as already mentioned previously, such "trinkets" also appeared in the composition of the remuneration of many OECD countries and the EU, therefore, when the issue of "incorporating such benefits" in salaries is addressed, it is important to be careful to avoid the loss of teachers' rights and at the same time to ensure full conditions of service to the population. However, you must also point out that such benefits (fixed or variable), do not generally affect labour or tax gatherings (such as social security contributions, etc.) which causes an "economy" to governments, leading them to often adopt "bonus policies or allowances" not as an incentive to teaching, but as a true form of cost savings in education. Another method of cost reduction policy, practiced by different governments, is hiring teachers on a temporary basis and not through public tenders. That's a discussion for another article, though. We hope that the information presented in the article had contributed to the discussion and understanding about teaching careers in Brazil and abroad, considering that it is a highly controversial issue and represents the different interests involved.

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