

United States / European Union 'Sanctions' and the Contestation for Political Space in Zimbabwe, 2000 to 2012*

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Abstract

Using Hossein Askari's imperialist and David Cortright's collective persuasion sanctions theories respectively, this article examines the efficacy of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) 'sanctions' on Zimbabwe's political landscape. The Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) depicts the sanctions as a Western imperial strategy to cause economic hardships on the Zimbabwean people so that they would replace it from power with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) through elections or violence. The party also view the sanctions as illegal punitive measures imposed on the country by the US and EU for embarking on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 which resulted in white farmers losing land. On the other hand of the debate the MDC parties, US and EU view the sanctions as collective persuasion measures meant to compel ZANU-PF to respect democratic principles, human rights, rule of law, and improve governance. Basing on primary sources, this article argues that, rather than compelling ZANU-PF to reform, sanctions have hardened the party's attitude towards the US, EU and the MDC. This study also observes that sanctions made the country's political crisis more complex as they provide ZANU-PF with justifications for the country's economic crisis and its refusal to implement democratic and governance reforms. The article concludes that sanctions, whether comprehensive or targeted, have serious shortcomings as an instrument of checking state delinquency.

Introduction

Zimbabwe has been under United States (US) and the European Union (EU) 'sanctions' since 2001 and 2002 respectively.ⁱ These sanctions include travel bans on named individuals, freezing of individual funds and assets, financial restrictions, arms embargoes and trade restrictions on companies linked to President Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). There are contestations over these sanctions. One perspective is that US and EU sanctions are a neo-colonial coercive measure meant to replace a 'revolutionary party', ZANU-PF, with a 'Western stooge', the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T)ⁱⁱ, through imposing economic hardships on ordinary Zimbabweans. ZANU-PF views the sanctions as comprehensive and responsible for economic problems causing the suffering of most Zimbabweans. The other perspective championed by the MDC-T, US and EU regards the sanctions as 'targeted restrictive measures' or 'smart sanctions' which were put on President Mugabe and his cronies in ZANU-PF and government for violating democratic principles and human rights. This article examines Zimbabwean perspectives and experiences on the issue of sanctions. The study argues that targeted sanctions have many limitations in that they often fail to yield the expected results on political leaders and provide them with a rhetorical anti-imperial nationalist discourse to justify their stay in power.

Background to US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe

This article employs two broad theories to examine the origins and efficacy of US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe's political landscape. Before looking at the theories, it is imperative to examine the context in which the sanctions were imposed. Between 1890 and 1980 Zimbabwe was a colony of British settlers. Through the use of various systems of land tenure and the colonial state's coercive apparatus most Africans were forcibly removed from their traditional land. Colonial racist agrarian policies forced most blacks into designated reserves which were overcrowded and usually with poor rainfall and infertile soil. Inequitable land distribution reduced blacks to a supply of cheap labour on white farms, mines and industry (Moyo 1994: 1). This contributed to black impoverishment during the colonial period.

During the Lancaster House negotiations of 1979 liberation movements, ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), compromised against wholesale land expropriation from the whites (Moyo 1999: 21). The Conservative British government made this compromise possible by promising the liberation movements to assist the post-colonial government with funds for market based land acquisition and resettlement (Moyo 1999: 21). In the spirit of reconciliation little emphasis was placed on land reform during the early years of independence. Government efforts to redistribute land did not bear much fruit due to lack of policy and legal framework, opposition by white farmers and lack of finance (Moyo 1999: 21). Sam Moyo (2000: 14) argues that land reform from 1980 to 1997 produced outcomes which were inequitable, undemocratic, inefficient and unsustainable. For example between 1980 and 1992 only about 56,000 households were allocated land in mostly unproductive and marginal areas (Moyo 1994: 5). By 1999 about 4500 white farmers who were less than 1 per cent of the total population continued to control and own over 40 per cent of the country's prime agricultural land (Moyo 2000: 6; Matereke 2010: 241). Thus the land question remained an unresolved and critical issue in the country's socio-economic and political landscape.

Since the late 1990s Zimbabwe has been in an economic and political crisis. A study by Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopolous (2003: 2-3) noted that while Zimbabwe may have similar historical, political and economic experiences with other African post-colonial states, its collapse was not inevitable. Although the causes of the crisis are many and complex, they have revolved around the country's participation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) war from 1997 to 2002, the unresolved land question, economic decline, human rights, the rule of law, constitutional reform and the implementation of democratic principles (Ndakaripa 2013: 28).ⁱⁱⁱ Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia supported the Laurent Kabila government in the DRC which was attacked by Rwandan and Ugandan rebel troops. After a thorough investigation in 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) condemned the Zimbabwean government for mismanaging the country's financial resources in the DRC war where it allegedly spends approximately US\$ 1 million a day (Bond and Manyanya 2003: 72). The United Nations also accused some top ZANU-PF politicians, army generals and politically connected business people of illicit trade in DRC minerals (Bond and Manyanya 2003: 72). In 2000 international multilateral financial institutions controlled by the US and EU like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and African Development Bank (ADB) imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe since its activities in the DRC were sanctionable according to their regulations. These sanctions include suspension of balance of payments support, technical assistance, voting and related rights by IMF; and declaration of ineligibility to access Fund resources (Gono 2007: 7).^{iv}

The legacy of colonial rule manifested itself in this crisis through the land question and the authoritarian nature of the state. The ZANU-PF regime intensified its efforts to redistribute land in the late 1990s in response to domestic political pressures. Facing stiff opposition from the MDC which was formed in 1999, civil society and the Western countries over authoritarianism, misgovernance and economic decline, the ZANU-PF government used the land question which was now supported by a strong nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric to gain political mileage at home and abroad. Jocelyn Alexander (2006: 1, 184) argues that the ZANU-PF government used the land question for claiming legitimacy and state making. ZANU-PF championed a new and narrow version of nationalism called the 'Third Chimurenga' which emphasised that land was the major factor which led to the 1960s and 1970s liberation war and must be distributed to the indigenous black people without compensation to the white farmers. ZANU-PF accused the former colonial power, Britain, for breaking its promise to provide funds for land reform and resettlement.

In 2000 the government initiated the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in which white owned farms were acquired by war veterans of the liberation war, ZANU-PF militias and peasants. The FTLRP, without considering the colonial injustices, was illegal in two ways. First, it was a violation of property rights enshrined in the country's constitution as no compensation was given to the white farmers for 'their land' and assets on it. Second, it was marred by violence as white farm owners and farm workers were often intimidated and beaten. This land reform was also accompanied by elite corruption as evidenced by multiple farm ownership by senior figures in ZANU-PF, government and state security. Land reform and economic mismanagement were also regarded as the major causes of high inflation and declining economy (Marongwe 2004: 25). Violation of property rights, violence, corruption and declining economy increased criticism from the MDC, Britain and other Western nations.

In June 2000 there were Parliamentary elections in which, the ZANU-PF government was accused by the MDC, civil society and Western governments of vote rigging, manipulation of judicial processes, intimidating, torturing, raping and murdering MDC supporters (Newsday, 03/04/2013).^v The EU election observer mission led by Pierre Schori delivered a damning report on those elections and accused ZANU-PF of human rights violations (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 3). In retaliation, during the 2002 Presidential elections, the ZANU-PF government barred Schori and other observers from certain EU countries like Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Britain and Ireland. Ironically, these are countries with a long history of engagement with Zimbabwe from the liberation war to the present day provision of aid (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 3). Observers from these countries were not welcome to Zimbabwe because to ZANU-PF, they were supporters of the MDC and were therefore players, not observers. This prompted the US, EU, Australia, Canada and New Zealand to impose sanctions on President Mugabe, and his inner circle in ZANU-PF, government and state security.

The US and EU have also imposed sanctions on diamonds mined in Zimbabwe for allegedly generating conflict, massive human rights abuses and corruption (Global Witness 2012).^{vi} In 2006 diamonds were discovered in the Chiadzwa area of Marange District in south eastern Zimbabwe. Tinashe Nyamunda and Patience Mukwambo (2012: 154) used Chabal and Daloz's concept of the instrumentalisation of disorder to examine how the fragmentation and informalisation of state power led to the rise of informal diamond mining and trade in Marange for the benefit of ZANU-PF politicians who wanted to gain votes and make profits. Lack of policy consistency in the Marange diamond industry led illicit trade. This informal trade which was sanctioned by some top ZANU-PF politicians led to a hide and seek game between informal miners and traders on one hand and, the army and police on the other hand. This often led to arrests, injuries and deaths of many informal miners and traders between 2006 and 2009. This raised concerns with international diamond trade watchdog, the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Since December 2008, the Kimberly Process Civil Society Coalition, some human rights groups in Zimbabwe, and Western countries like the US, Britain, Belgium and Canada have called for the banning of Zimbabwe's diamonds on the international market as they are 'bloody diamonds' (Wikipedia Marange Diamond Fields 2012).^{vii} However, since 2009, the KPCS investigations found Zimbabwe's diamonds 'conflict free' and certified them for international market in November 2011 (Wikipedia Marange Diamond Fields 2012; The Sunday Mail, 6-12/11/2012: 3).^{viii} Despite the certification of Zimbabwean diamonds by the KPCS, the US and the EU ordered their home companies to boycott them. In December 2011, the US added diamond mining companies Mbada Diamonds and Marange Resources to the list of companies under sanctions (The Sunday Mail, 26/02/2012 to 26/03/2012: 1). It is in this context that the origins of US and EU sanctions are explained in terms of the land question, human rights, rule of law and democratic principles.

Are US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe imperialist tools?: A theoretical overview

The US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe can be explained using the following theories.

Theory A. Sanctions as imperialist tools: The first theory contends that sanctions are a tool for developed countries to continue their dominance of developing countries by either interfering in decision making processes or by effecting regime changes. Hossein Askari *et al* (2003: 4) argue that throughout history, nations, political entities and individuals have used economic sanctions as a means to gain an advantage in domestic and foreign affairs. However, the desire for political, economic and cultural hegemony by powerful countries has always been resisted by smaller countries and groups (Askari *et al* 2003: 4). This theory views sanctions as a measure to punish a country for failure to concur in a sender country's policy or overturning a policy in the target country found unpopular in the sender country (Askari *et al* 2003: 16). Such objectionable policies can either be domestic or foreign. In the same vein Gary Clyde Hufbauer *et al* (2007: 5) argue that sanctions are used by a sender country as a tool to interfere in the internal affairs of another sovereign government without immediate introduction of military force. In the Zimbabwean context, ZANU-PF asserts that the imposition of sanctions was a result of the West's anger over its domestic policy, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, that was initiated by the government in 2000 to empower the landless black majority (The Herald, 13/10/2009: 4). The party argues that Britain and other Western countries never wanted indigenous black people to get land they were robbed of during the colonial period. During the 2001 parliamentary debates, ZANU-PF legislator Reuben Marumahoko insisted that sanctions were imposed to assist the MDC-T to get into power so that farms that were distributed to Blacks for resettlement will be given back to the Whites (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 27, No. 59, 29/03/2001: col. 6174).

Similarly, the imposition of sanctions on Marange diamonds by the US and EU is viewed by ZANU-PF as an attempt by these 'imperial' powers to deny the country its sovereign right to assert its control over its natural resources.

ZANU-PF argues that its foreign policy in the DRC civil war from 1997 to 2002 led to the imposition of sanctions. Zimbabwe's top ZANU-PF politicians and army generals were accused by Western countries of overspending the country's limited financial resources in the war and for systematically looting minerals from the DRC for personal enrichment (Bond and Manyanya 2003: 72). Zimbabwe's participation in the DRC war is mentioned in the US' Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) as another justification for imposing sanctions (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001).^{ix} Saviour Kasukuwere is one of the ZANU-PF legislators who debated in parliament arguing that Zimbabwe was ironically being punished for helping in a regional peace keeping process (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 27, No. 59, 29/03/2001: col. 6151). Kasukuwere said Zimbabwe's role was supposed to be applauded because people in DRC could have been subjected to genocide while the whole world was just observing like what happened in Rwanda in 1994 (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 27, No. 59, 29/03/2001: col. 6151). The US is viewed by ZANU-PF as an imperial power which wanted to capitalise on instability in DRC and the Great Lakes region.

In this theory, sanctions are regarded as an instrument of mass pauperisation and terror (The Herald, 10/12/2009: 8). The wisdom underlying the imposition of sanctions, according to this theory, is the assumption that 'economic pain creates political gain' (The Financial Gazette, 10-16/09/2009: 8). The rationale is that the economic hardship caused by sanctions would force the targeted regime to comply with the interests of the sender country. This view espouses that the citizenry shall either put enough pressure on their government to alter its policies in accordance with the demands of the sender state or the government will be ousted via the ballot box or if need be, the bullet (The Herald, 06/03/2009: 6). This strategy was used by the US against countries aligned to socialist and communist world during the Cold War. In this context, the use of sanctions can generally be regarded as political because they are used to influence how other governments behave at both domestic and international level, and sometimes to effect regime changes (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, The Senate, Vol. 16, No. 3: 09/08/2006: col. 50). This theory generally views sanctions as imperialist tools seeking to influence the decisions of other countries and sometimes deter other countries from adopting policies which do not conform to those of imperialist powers.

ZANU-PF asserts that the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe presents a new dimension to US and EU's post-liberation neo-colonial agenda in Africa, seeking to set up client states (The Herald, 09/04/2009: 11). The party accuses the US and EU of meddling in Zimbabwe's internal affairs and totally dismisses the MDC-T's view that sanctions were imposed because of human rights violations, bad governance and failure to follow democratic principles. During the 2006 parliamentary debates over sanctions ZANU-PF legislator Senator Aguy Clement M. Georgios argued that although Zimbabwean democracy is not perfect, it is a deception to say that sanctions were imposed because of ZANU-PF's failure to follow universal democratic principles (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, The Senate, Vol. 16, No. 3, 09/08/2006: col. 55).^x Georgios advances that Zimbabwe needs time and space to fashion, style, model and develop its own political systems as with all other nations and must not accept to be cajoled into readily accepting other nations' prescriptions (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, The Senate, Vol. 16, No. 3, 09/08/2006: col. 55).

ZANU-PF claims that when Britain, the EU and the US realised that they could not effect regime change in Zimbabwe they decided, with MDC's complicity, to put the country under sanctions (The Herald, 13/10/2009: 4). Furthermore, ZANU-PF accuses Tsvangirai and other top MDC officials of globetrotting, tarnishing the country's image and urging the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and Western countries to isolate Zimbabwe and withhold support for programmes aimed at resuscitating the country's economy (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 27, No. 59: col. 6174). ZANU-PF argues that MDC politicians called for the imposition of sanctions to manipulate the electorate to achieve political gains by creating economic hardships. This would result in citizens' dissatisfaction with the ZANU-PF government and force them to vote for MDC or revolt against the ZANU-PF regime (The Herald, 06/03/2009: 6). Consequently, this would result in regime change and the setting up of a client state. In this way, ZANU-PF interprets the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe as an imperialist agenda in which the MDC is a stooge of the Western countries.

This scenario concurs with Gary Clyde Hufbauer *et al's* (2007: 13) argument that powerful countries in the West often resort to sanctions in an effort to change target countries' regimes even when they are not threats to the sender country's national security. In this context, sanctions can be viewed as political-economic measures that Western countries use to depose regimes in developing countries.

ZANU-PF avers that sanctions were tightened and renewed because President Mugabe had openly criticized American and European neo-colonialism on Third World countries especially in Africa and Latin America. ZANU-PF maintains that sanctions were imposed and renewed on Zimbabwe because the Presidents George Walker Bush and the current Barack Obama of the US view President Mugabe as 'the most serious threat' to US foreign policy and core values (The Herald, 09/04/2009: 11). In this way sanctions are viewed by ZANU-PF as a tool to influence Zimbabwean politics and impose an MDC-T regime which will conform to US foreign policy. It is interesting to note that most sanctions applied in the 1970s and 1980s involved developed countries placing sanctions on less developed countries (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, The Senate, Vol. 16, No. 3, 09/08/2006: col. 51). During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries it seems sanctions are US and EU policy strategy to objectionable actions of foreign governments in Africa, Latin America, Middle East and Asia.

Theory B. Sanctions as persuasive measures to check state delinquency: The second theory regards sanctions as a means of checking state delinquency in order to enforce collective international security. David Cortright and George A. Lopez (2002: 16), argue that sanctions are best understood as instruments of persuasion rather than punishment. The use of sanctions is regarded as a better option than military intervention. According to this theory, the aim of sanctions is to compel the target country to adopt policies which fall within the framework of universal code of conduct through observing human rights, rule of law, democracy and international peace. Joseph Kurebwa (2000: 3) observes that a delinquent state threatens international security either through acts of aggression or by creating domestic conditions that are conducive for international anarchy. The responsibility for restraining the target state would be collective, since the targeted country threatens world order.

Persuasion or corrective sanctions have been used against both western and non-western countries. At different times in history countries such as Italy, Austria, Portugal, Belarus, Burma/Myanmar, Transdnestria and North Korea had targeted sanctions applied to them by the League of Nations, United Nations, US and EU to persuade them to conform to universal code of conduct. Moreover, the African Union imposed sanctions on African regimes which took power unconstitutionally, for example, in the Central African Republic, Togo, the Comoros, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar (Eriksson 2010: 4-70). All these examples, in and outside Africa, can be used to challenge the argument that sanctions are exclusively used as a tool to dominate developing countries.

According to this theory, the aim of persuasion sanctions is not to cause economic damage, but to isolate, encourage dialogue and negotiate with an abusive regime (Cortright and Lopez 2002: 16). This implies that sanctions must not have a devastating humanitarian impact but only need to cause sufficient hardship and discomfort to motivate the targeted regime to enter into a dialogue with the international community. This means that the sanctioners must link the offer to lift sanctions with the sanctionee's concrete steps towards compliance (Cortright and Lopez 2002: 16). This result in mutual understanding, good faith and encourages further concessions. In the case of Zimbabwe, while sanctions are in place, there is engagement between the coalition government and the EU. The EU has promised to suspend some sanctions after a credible constitutional referendum. The sender countries are supposed to identify any reform groups or opposition constituencies that may exist within the targeted country (Cortright and Lopez 2002: 16). According to Cortright and Lopez (2002: 17), targeted sanctions are designed to prevent adverse consequences on ordinary people and sometimes to provide support and encouragement to reform constituencies. In the Zimbabwean context, the MDC-T has been portrayed by the US and other Western media as a reform-minded constituent.

The MDC, US and EU maintain that sanctions on Zimbabwe are measures to persuade ZANU-PF to meet international standards of a civilised nation by observing human rights, democratic principles and respect for the rule of law. During the House of Assembly debates over the origins of sanctions in March 2001, MDC legislator Tendai Biti, now Finance Minister, said the ZANU-PF government deserved sanctions because it disrespects the United Nations and the then Organisation of African Union (OAU) human rights charter, and Zimbabwe's constitution and laws (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 27, No. 59: cols. 6242-43). The MDC's argument that targeted sanctions were imposed on ZANU-PF decision-making elites because they failed to address the question of the rule of law and good governance concurs with the persuasion sanctions theory.

When debates over the origins of sanctions commenced in the House of Assembly in 2001, the MDC legislators said the international community imposed them because ZANU-PF's had violated democratic principles and human rights for long. Former MDC legislator Gabriel Chaibva, now a staunch ZANU-PF supporter, articulated how the ZANU-PF government had violated the rights of political opponents since 1985 in violation of international norms of conduct (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 27, No. 59: cols. 6158, 6160). Other examples of ZANU-PF's misbehaviour in the full view of the international community cited by MDC legislators includes President Mugabe's record of saying that he does not recognise the opposition and, even if they were to win elections, he will not allow them to govern.^{xi} The MDC also cited the Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa whom it accused of openly attacking the judiciary by threatening judges with war veterans and calling on them to resign for ruling in favour of the white farmers and the MDC (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 27, No. 59, 29/03/2001: col. 6147). To the MDC all these actions deserve the imposition of sanctions. In general, the MDC-T's argument is, if ZANU-PF was to avoid sanctions, which it invited upon itself as a government, it must address key issues around human rights, restoration of law and order, respect for the judiciary and governance.

The US and EU argue that 'restrictive measures', not comprehensive sanctions, were imposed on few individuals in the top structures of ZANU-PF and President Mugabe's government to support a peaceful transition to democratic governance. When President George W Bush announced that he had signed into American public law, the ZIDERA on December 21 2001, he stated that,

...the provisions of this important legislation will support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful democratic change, achieve economic growth, and restore the rule of law (Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, The Senate, Vol. 16, No. 3, 09/08/2006: col. 46).

Thus there was the moral and political justification for the US sanctions legislation. Since February 2009, the US and the EU have justified the renewal of sanctions citing the refusal by President Mugabe and ZANU-PF to fully implement the provisions of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which led to the formation of the inclusive government with the MDC formations. From this perspective sanctions imposed on ZANU-PF are regarded as a tool to persuade the party to reform and not punishment.

Contextualising US/EU sanctions on Zimbabwe in theories A and B: The imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the West cannot narrowly be explained in terms of ZANU-PF's nationalist rhetoric of the West's anger over the country's land reform programme or MDC's neo-liberal human rights and governance discourse. Each side's position is too extreme and misleading. What seems to have happened is that ZANU-PF responded to increasing Western, civil society and MDC's political opposition by using the emotive land question to gain political support from a large constituency of the electorate, the land hungry peasants. In the process of trying to maintain power through the land issue, the ZANU-PF government violated white farmers' property (land) rights. However, those rights were based on unjustified colonial laws and constitution. There is no doubt that Western countries, especially Britain, were provoked by the violent manner in which land was taken from white farmers. Failure to recognise white farmers' land rights, and other human rights abuses during elections and in Marange diamond fields, led to the imposition of sanctions. In this way, one can safely conclude that the land reform programme, human rights abuses and failure to conform to international democratic and governance principles all led to the imposition of sanctions, without the risk of adopting ZANU-PF and MDC's extreme propaganda positions.

In this study, I argue that the imperialist and persuasion sanctions theories are applicable to the complex Zimbabwe sanctions debate. I submit to Gary Clyde Hufbauer *et al's* (2007: 157) argument that in applying sanctions sender countries usually pursue more than one goal, and the goals often evolve over time. As the evidence below shows, the US and EU imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe to persuade the ZANU-PF regime to respect human rights and the rule of law, democratic principles and stop electoral fraud. However, overtime these powers also sought to change leadership in Zimbabwe by openly supporting the MDC as an alternative to the ZANU-PF regime. My argument here can be supported by Richard N. Haas (1997: 74) who argues that the US uses sanctions as corrective measures and to oust governments. Western countries do not clearly announce their goals but there is little doubt that they want a regime change in Zimbabwe. As noted by other scholars, the imposition of sanctions on a target state can be a response to domestic pressures in the sender country as much as they can be a response to foreign disputes (Askari et al 2003: 4).

The US and EU governments could have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe to gain political support in their own countries as they wanted to be seen promoting human rights and democracy in the world. I also argue that Western sanctions on Zimbabwe, whether they are comprehensive or targeted, at least for now, are less effective as an instrument to persuade ZANU-PF to respect human rights, rule of law and to implement democratic principles.

The nature of US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe

Before examining the efficacy of US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe's political landscape, it is necessary to outline the nature of these powers' embargoes on Zimbabwe. Part of the United States' ZIDERA states that:

... the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose and vote against (1) any extension by the respective institution of any loan, credit or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; or (2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001).^{xii}

In this Act the term 'international financial institutions' means the multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This part of the Act shows that the financial restrictions on Zimbabwe are not targeted on few ZANU-PF individuals but on the whole society. The Act does not target or mention any individual but it affects the country and it is at this point that the idea of targeted restrictive measures falls apart.

Section 4 (2) of ZIDERA states that:

... the Secretary of the Treasury should direct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to which the United States is a member to propose to undertake financial and technical support for Zimbabwe, especially support that is intended to promote Zimbabwe's economic recovery and development, the stabilisation of the Zimbabwean dollar, and the viability of Zimbabwe's democratic institutions (Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001).^{xiii}

This part of the US sanctions law provides moral and financial support to constituencies which are viewed as pro-democracy like the MDC-T, Non-Governmental Organisations, the private electronic and print media; and some civil society organisations. In addition, in 2003, the US government put other sanctions on Zimbabwe which banned more than 250 individuals and companies from doing business with US entities (The Financial Gazette, 12-18/03/2009: 9). Again, targeting companies which employ ordinary people, produce goods needed by the society and generate foreign currency, defeats the whole idea of smart sanctions.

EU slapped targeted sanctions on top government and ruling ZANU-PF party officials in 2002, a year after the US enacted the ZIDERA (The Financial Gazette, 4-9/01/2008: 9). Existing EU sanctions include an arms embargo, visa bans and asset freezes on senior government and ZANU-PF officials including President Robert Mugabe (The Financial Gazette, 12-18/03/2009: 9). Under the embargo, state officials are barred from travelling to Europe unless they are on official United Nations business (The Financial Gazette, 12-18/03/2009: 9). Companies associated with ZANU-PF are barred from conducting business with the EU (The Financial Gazette, 4-9/01/2008: 9). Until February 2012, EU sanctions also include media houses and journalists who were accused of helping the ZANU-PF government in 'stifling freedom of expression' in Zimbabwe (The Financial Gazette, 5-11/02/2009: 1). The EU claims that Zimbabwe was never under sanctions, but economic restrictive measures (The Financial Gazette, 10-16/09/2009: 8). A report by the EU Parliament in May 2011 insisted that 'targeted sanctions' on Zimbabwe were and are not responsible for the decline of the living standards of the ordinary people. The European Parliament argues that withdrawn investment and trade by the West was replaced by alternative investment, especially from China (European Parliament 2011: 26). Contrary to ZANU-PF assertions, the report also emphasised that EU sanctions did not cause a humanitarian crisis as the EU left humanitarian aid flows unaffected (Ndakaripa 2013: 31; European Parliament 2011: 26). However, the argument that EU sanctions are targeted does not hold much water because they also target companies. Moreover, just like the US, EU travel restrictions on senior government officials negatively affect the country's business operations and ultimately cause hardships on ordinary people who are not the intended target.

As highlighted above the US's ZIDERA orders its directors to international financial institutions to block any financial assistance to the government of Zimbabwe.

However, despite the influence of the US and the EU, it must be noted that multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and ADB have agreed on certain actions by individuals, firms and governments which can result in the imposition of sanctions. These 'sanctionable practices' include financial mismanagement, corruption, fraud and political repression. They practices can lead a government to be declared ineligible to access their fund resources (The World Bank Sanctions Regime: 4).^{xiv} The World Bank and IMF argue that corruption undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends (The World Bank Sanctions Regime: 3).^{xv} These financial institutions want to ensure that funds they provide are used for their intended purposes and efficiently (The World Bank Sanctions Regime: 1).^{xvi}

Since the late 1990s the ZANU-PF government has been accused of lack of transparency, accountability and corruption in managing the country's financial resources. These accusations increased when the government paid unbudgeted gratuities of Z\$ 50 000 (then about US\$ 4, 500) and monthly pensions of Z\$ 2, 000 (then US\$ 180, 00) to war veterans of the 1960s and 1970s liberation struggle (Muzondidya 2009: 198). The government also spend a lot of money in DRC war which strained national coffers (Bond and Manyanya 2003: 72). This financial mismanagement allegedly caused high inflation and economic decline in the late 1990s. The IMF suspended Zimbabwe's voting rights citing its waste of financial resources in the DRC war and the country's overdue financial obligations to the IMF's General Resources Account (GRA) (Bond and Manyanya 2003: 8). Despite the clearance of the critical GRA in February 2006, when Zimbabwe fully paid US\$210.6 million it owed the Fund, the IMF Board upheld sanctions on Zimbabwe (IMF Executive Board Uphold Sanctions Against Zimbabwe, Press Release No. 06/45).^{xvii} The IMF justified upholding sanctions arguing that Zimbabwe still need to clear its outstanding arrears to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF Executive Board Uphold Sanctions Against Zimbabwe, Press Release No. 06/45).^{xviii} Thus, the IMF rules were modified to ensure that Zimbabwe remained under sanctions. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the US and EU have influenced the international multilateral institutions to impose financial sanctions on Zimbabwe. The World Bank sanctions framework makes it clear that law and policies of other countries are not binding and cannot supersede the Bank's own legal framework (The World Bank Group Sanctions Regime: 15).^{xix} However, the World Bank admits that laws and policies of other countries can provide a useful point of reference to cases where its own legal framework is not sufficient to deal with cases of corruption and misgovernance (The World Bank Group Sanctions Regime: 15).^{xx} In fact the World Bank's sanctions processes have been based on a survey of Western legal systems.

Financial sanctions have a negative impact on the country because since 1966 Zimbabwe has in one way or the other depended on external support (Gono 2007: 11). Since 2000, the country started experiencing capital flight and shortage of foreign currency which resulted in the country accumulating external payment arrears and failing to import critical supplies (Gono 2007: 10-11). Since the formation of the Inclusive Government Finance Minister and MDC-T Secretary General Tendai Biti has been calling for the removal of ZIDERA arguing that it blocks international financial institutions from extending any direct financial support to Zimbabwe (New Zimbabwe).^{xxi} In January 2012, Biti condemned the US for adding Mbada Diamonds and Marange Resources to its sanctions list arguing that the move cut the country's source of revenue thereby affecting the generality of the people (The Sunday Mail, 15-21/01/2012: 1). Biti said the move was also against the spirit of engagement with the US government. The leader of the other MDC formation in government and the current Minister of Industry and Commerce Welshman Ncube has also shifted his stance and is now opposing sanctions on business entities like the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) (The Sunday Mail, 15-21/07/2012: 11). These views show how the MDC formations have evolved and transformed from opposition politics to political parties in a coalition government which need to address the country's economic problems. More importantly, it seems MDC formations have shifted their stance on the sanctions debate because they are in charge of 'economic development ministries' like Finance (MDC-T), Economic Planning and Investment Promotion (MDC-T); State Enterprises and Parastatals (MDC-T); and Industry and Commerce (MDC-M) which are directly affected by sanctions. This evidence shows that, although ZANU-PF has been using sanctions as a campaign strategy, it is true that financial restrictions on the government by the US and the EU negatively affects the Zimbabwean economy in general thereby causing economic hardships on the ordinary people. ZANU-PF has use anti-sanctions notions by senior figures in the MDC parties as a political capital to exonerate itself from any blame on economic decline in the 2000s decade.

The efficacy of US - EU sanctions and Zimbabwe's political landscape

Rather than forcing ZANU-PF to reform, sanctions seem to have hardened its attitude against the US and EU. It is interesting to note that on 7 November 2002 Zimbabwe imposed retaliatory sanctions on Britain which it accused of influencing the EU, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government downgraded the United Kingdom from category 'A' to category 'B' of its visa regime (The Herald, 08/11/2002: 1). Ninety three top officials of the then British government including Prime Minister Tony Blair, ministers and heads of departments were banned from travelling to Zimbabwe. Others put on Zimbabwe sanctions are members of organisations accused of campaigning for the isolation of Zimbabwe and funding the MDC. These include patrons of the Zimbabwe Democracy Trust (ZDT) and board members of the Westminster Fund for Democracy (WFD) (The Herald, 08/11/2002: 1). The ZANU-PF government said the decision to impose sanctions was taken to safeguard the country's sovereignty, secure its national interests, peace and stability. Although these retaliatory sanctions may be insignificant to Britain it shows the defiance of the then ZANU-PF regime.

Sanctions also have little impact on ZANU-PF political leaders as they had redirected the pain of sanctions onto its political opponents in the MDC-T. When the ZANU-PF government failed to deliver in the 2000s decade because of incompetence and corruption it blamed Western sanctions as ordinary people continued to suffer.^{xxii} ZANU-PF has also used sanctions to justify its poor performance in the 2008 elections by arguing that the political battleground in Zimbabwe is not level and is in favour of the MDC-T because of sanctions. ZANU-PF argues that sanctions detract from free and fair elections as people cannot freely and fairly express their will when they are suffering under the embargoes (The Herald, 03/11/2009: 4). During the early days of the inclusive government, ZANU-PF argued that it was not strategic for the country to hold elections under the sanctions regime because it believed that voters are likely to be influenced by economic hardships caused by sanctions to vote for MDC-T.^{xxiii} Until recently, ZANU-PF had been arguing that one of the effective ways to get the US and the EU to lift their sanctions is to delay the holding of elections until sanctions are lifted.^{xxiv} This is an example of how ZANU-PF has used sanctions to justify its position on issues of national importance and in challenging the MDC parties.

After disputed Presidential elections in June 2008, ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M entered into dialogue guided by the SADC and the AU with the aim of forming an inclusive government. South Africa was given the role of a mediator and facilitator. The negotiations resulted in the three political parties signing the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 11 September 2008. This agreement led to the formation of the Inclusive Government in February 2009. In Article 5 of the GPA, ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M acknowledged that sanctions are a reality and were causing economic decline (The Global Political Agreement).^{xxv} Soon after the formation of the Inclusive Government, the three governing parties ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M set up a Re-engagement Committee to negotiate the removal of sanctions and the normalisation of relations with the US and EU (The Herald, 17/03/2009: 6). The team is led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Simbarashe Mumbengegwi and comprises ministers of Finance, Regional Integration and International Co-operation, and Industry and Commerce.

However, ZANU-PF and MDC-T have been trading fierce accusations and counter accusations on sanctions. ZANU-PF insists that the MDC-T party has the responsibility to call for their removal since it invited them. ZANU-PF and some political analysts believe that Prime Minister Tsvangirai and his MDC-T party were calling for the lifting of sanctions publicly but secretly encouraged the US and EU to maintain them (The Standard, 7-13/06/2009: 2). On the other hand Prime Minister Tsvangirai and his MDC-T party insist that the removal of sanctions lies entirely with ZANU-PF which should improve its image at the international stage by opening up the democratic space, respect human rights and the rule law (The Standard, 6-12/12/2009). The MDC-T has also been persuading ZANU-PF to fulfil its GPA obligations to get the sanctions lifted by the US and EU. The disagreements are threatening to derail the full implementation of the GPA (The Standard, 6-12/12/2009). Outstanding issues in the GPA include:

- restoration of democratic governance,
- restoration of the rule of law and respect for people's freedoms,
- equitable power-sharing between President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai,
- re-appointment of provincial governors, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor, Attorney-General and permanent secretaries,

- reform of state security sectors and
- the removal of sanctions (The Zimbabwe Independent, 2/04/2009: 1).

ZANU-PF has refused to fully implement the agreements in the GPA arguing that the most important outstanding issue is the lifting of sanctions imposed by the US and the EU (The Sunday Mail, 13-19/09/2009: 1).^{xxvi} SADC argues that the insistence by the US and EU to keep the sanctions in place has dampened wide expectations of a quick return to political and economic normalcy in Zimbabwe (The Herald, 09/04/2009: 11). Former and current South African presidents, Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, respectively, who have been mediators to Zimbabwe's three political parties, have called for the removal of sanctions to facilitate the full implementation of the GPA (Zimeye, 27/03/2009).^{xxvii} Once sanctions are removed ZANU-PF will be left with no sound reason to justify its refusal to fully implement the GPA and introduce democratic reforms in governance, media and security sector (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 4). Thus US and EU sanctions complicated the political processes in Zimbabwe. Some political commentators said the imposition and extension of sanctions was unnecessary because it is affecting the operations of the inclusive government formed by ZANU-PF and the two MDC parties.

ZANU-PF has used sanctions as a campaign strategy to attempt to create what David Cortright and George A. Lopez (2002: 17) have called the 'rally-round-the-flag-effect'. This is when the psychological effect of real or perceived international coercion line up domestic groups behind the government (Drezner 1999: 12). Daniel W. Drezner (2003: 107) has argued that embargoes targeting a regime may strengthen it by increasing civilian support for the government. The ZANU-PF party through state controlled print and electronic media insist that Zimbabwe's economic problems are a result of 'illegal racist economic sanctions' imposed by Western imperialist powers to effect a regime change in the country. A report by the EU notes that due to ZANU-PF's monopoly of state media, the ordinary people remains uneducated about the nature of Western sanctions and their role in Zimbabwe to this day (European Parliament 2011: 25). President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party launched the nationwide National Anti-Sanctions Petition Campaign rally in Harare on 1 March 2011 (The Herald, 01/03/2011: 1). The campaign sought to mobilise politicians, government officials, leaders of industry and commerce, churches, traditional leaders, representatives of farmers' organisations and ordinary people to call for the removal of sanctions (The Herald, 01/03/2011: 1). In this campaign, ZANU-PF expected to get over two million signatures on a petition for the removal of Western sanctions. However, the boycotts of the anti-sanctions petition campaign rallies by senior members of the MDC-T, including Prime Minister Tsvangirai shows serious divisions in Zimbabwe's coalition government over sanctions. The US and EU have dismissed the anti-sanctions petitions insisting that there has to be real improvement in human rights, rule of law and implementation of democratic principles for the sanctions to be removed (The Daily News, 09/03/2011: 1).

In general US and EU sanctions are less effective on ZANU-PF because of economic and geo-political factors. According to Richard N. Haas (1997: 78) it is often very difficult to generate international support for sanctions. Most countries, including Western, prefer normal economic relations as sanctions, whether targeted or comprehensive, tend to have adverse impact on their own economies. Gary Clyde Hufbauer (2007: 59) argues that the impact of sanctions on the target country can be reduced if it can rely on its friends to compensate for the burdens imposed by sanctions. Furthermore, the psychological rebuke is considerably weakened when other countries provide assistance to the targeted nation (Hufbauer 2007: 59). Targeted persons in ZANU-PF can still travel to other African countries, Eastern Europe, Asia, Middle East and Latin America. Studies have indicated that in several cases, countries targeted by sanctions unite against sender countries (Hufbauer 2007: 59-60). Zimbabwe has good relations with other countries under US and/or EU sanctions such as Cuba, Iran and North Korea. ZANU-PF's anti-imperialist rhetoric has been supported by former liberation movements in Southern Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) of Angola, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) of Tanzania, Liberation Front for Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique, and South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia have called the West to lift sanctions on Zimbabwe (The Herald, 12/08/2011: 1). These geo-political factors have rendered US and EU sanctions less effective. Mikael Eriksson (2007: 60) has suggested that for sanctions to have more impact on ZANU-PF leadership, the EU could work with countries in the southern Africa region to prevent sanctions evasion. However, this is difficult because most countries in the region, except Botswana, have stood with ZANU-PF since the beginning of the 2000s crisis.

US and EU sanctions have also been less effective on ZANU-PF because of poor coordination in their implementation. There are differences of opinion within the EU member states, the US, and other sanctioning countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand on implementation. There was a long debate among EU member states when the bloc allowed the then Minister of State Enterprises and Parastatals in President's Office Paul Mangwana and the then Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic Development Christopher Kuruneri to attend the November 25 – 28 2002 EU-African Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) 5th parliamentary session in Brussels (Eriksson 2007: 71). In 2004 French President Jacques Chirac invited President Mugabe for France – Africa Summit despite objections of several EU member states. Moreover, there is no consensus on who should and should not be on the sanctions list (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 6). This has resulted in some individuals, like journalists, sanctioned by the EU travelling to the US because they are not on that country's sanctions list. Moreover, the sanctioned individuals take advantage of UN meetings to travel to countries which imposed travel bans on them. Mugabe usually travel with a delegation of more than forty individuals, which critics say is too big for a small country like Zimbabwe with poor economy. Individuals under sanctions take advantage of UN meetings to shop and conduct their business in US and EU. There are also differences of opinion within the EU on removing the targeted measures (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 3). Some EU countries like France, Germany and Denmark prefer dialogue and engagement with ZANU-PF while others like Britain and Netherlands want to impose tough measures (Pan-African News Wire).^{xxviii} ZANU-PF has manipulated these divisions to present sanctions as illegal in state controlled media.

ZANU-PF has hardened its attitude towards the US and EU as it now boasts that trade in diamonds provides the country a way out of the financial blockade by the Western countries thereby safeguarding its independence and sovereignty from imperialism (The Sunday Mail, 14-20/08/2011: D2). World-renowned diamond industry analyst Chaim Even Zohar argues that Zimbabwe is projected to satisfy 30 per cent of world diamond demand by 2015 and Western nations have a lot to benefit from normalising relations with Zimbabwe (The Sunday Mail, 25-31/03/2012: 1). US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwean diamonds are proving less effective because countries like India, Russia, Israel and Lebanon have emerged as a major market for the gems.^{xxix} ZANU-PF argues that profits from diamonds can be used to finance the farming industry and infrastructure which have allegedly been decimated by sanctions. However, most of the profits from the Marange diamonds benefit ZANU-PF, its top elite and the country's top securocrats. The Ministry of Mines and Mining Development is headed by ZANU-PF politburo member, Obert Mpfu. There is lack of transparency and accountability in the selling and use of profits from diamonds. For example, from January to March 2012, the Ministry of Finance received only US\$ 30, 4 million from the Ministry of Mines against the target of US\$122, 5 million (Newsday, 28/07/2012: 2). Besides enriching its elite and the securocrats, it seems ZANU-PF is preparing to use diamond profits to campaign and buy votes in the next election. Since the economy has stabilised and the government can use diamond profits to counter Western financial blockade ZANU-PF is now confident that it can run the country without its MDC partners. This evidence shows beyond doubt that, as long as ZANU-PF maintains its monopoly over diamond revenue, EU and US sanctions will not compel it to comply with Western standards of human rights, democracy and governance.

However, the criterion for lifting of the 'measures' appears to have moved from human rights to focus on whether all political parties (in reality ZANU-PF) have complied with their agreements in the GPA (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 2). On 20 February 2012 the EU eased its sanctions on Zimbabwe by removing fifty one individuals including six journalists from the travel ban and asset freeze list (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 2). Twenty companies were also removed from the sanctions list. Two ZANU-PF ministers, Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa and Foreign Affairs Minister Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, involved in negotiations with the EU, were also removed temporarily from the travel ban list so that they can take part in negotiations in Europe. In easing these sanctions the EU noted the gradual but incomplete creation of a conducive environment for the holding of transparent elections (Zimbabwe Europe Network 2012: 2). This action by the EU fits in the persuasion sanctions theory which argues that sanctions are an effective tool to check state delinquency when the sanctioneer rewards the sanctionee for partial compliance to encourage dialogue.

On 23 July 2012 the EU has indicated that sanctions can be suspended if the country holds a credible referendum on the new constitution. This was not received positively with ZANU-PF state controlled print and electronic media which presented the matter to the Zimbabwean people as if the EU extended sanctions without any intention to remove them (The Herald, 24/07/2012: 1). This can tempt one to think that ZANU-PF do not want sanctions to be removed because it is a useful campaign tool.

It seems that ZANU-PF will not change its undemocratic ways in the near future in order to get sanctions removed. This is because the opening up of democratic space like media reforms, de-politicisation of state institutions and security sector reforms are likely to result in its removal from power. Since some senior ZANU-PF politicians are likely to be prosecuted for human rights abuses committed since the 1980s they would prefer to remain in power. They might regard this as a better option than reforming; getting sanctions removed and be prosecuted either in Zimbabwe or at the Hague. Any major political reforms which might be expected in Zimbabwe must take into account the uncertainty and insecurity which some ZANU-PF top leaders feel should they be removed from power.

Conclusion

While it is true that the US and EU have imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe following human rights abuses, failure to follow democratic principles and bad governance, there is little doubt that sanctions are also being used to further these powers' global geo-political interests. This includes a change of government which will result in ZANU-PF being effectively replaced by MDC-T as the ruling party. This can hardly be questioned when these powers are currently competing for dominance in Africa with China, India and Russia. US and EU sanctions are not targeted as intended by sender countries. However, most of Zimbabwe's economic problems cannot be blamed on the US and EU sanctions but on incompetence, mismanagement and corruption of the previous ZANU-PF government. The paradox of US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe is that while the rationale was to force ZANU-PF to reform they are achieving the opposite as they seem to be hardening the party's authoritarian grip on power and its anti-West rhetoric in foreign policy. ZANU-PF has used sanctions against MDC-T by presenting it as a Western stooge and refuses to implement the agreements in the GPA. Hence, sanctions, whether comprehensive or targeted, affect the country political landscape in favour of ZANU-PF. As this study has shown, the impact of US and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe are more psychological and political than economic.

Notes

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¹ Zimbabwe is also under sanctions from Australia, New Zealand and Canada. This article exclusively focuses on US and EU sanctions because it is burdensome for a small article such the current one to analyse the complexities of the sanctions of all these other countries.

² The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was formed in 1999 and was led by Morgan Tsvangirai. The party divided into two in 2005. The united MDC prior 2005 will be referred to as MDC. The larger and most influential faction which is led by Morgan Tsvangirai was renamed MDC-Tsvangirai (MDC-T). The faction led by Tsvangirai since 2005 will be referred to as MDC-T. The smaller faction formerly led by Arthur Mutambara and now by Welshman Ncube retained the name MDC. For the purpose of clarity and to avoid confusion in this article it shall be referred to as MDC - Mutambara (MDC-M). This faction has shifted its goalposts on the sanctions debate, siding and opposing both ZANU-PF and MDC-T depending on the political context. The real debate on sanctions now is therefore between ZANU-PF and MDC-T. ZANU-PF and the two MDCs formed a coalition government in February 2009 with Robert Mugabe as President, Morgan Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister and Arthur Mutambara as Deputy Prime Minister.

³ Musiwaro Ndakaripa, 'The debate over the nature and impact of the United States and European Union 'sanctions' on Zimbabwe, 2001 to 2012' in *OSSREA Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2013.

⁴ Gideon Gono, *The Impact of Sanctions*, Harare: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2007, p. 7. Available at www.rbz.co.zw/pdfs/farm_mech/sanctions.pdf, retrieved on 23 July 2012.

⁵ Musiwaro Ndakaripa, 'Why Zimbos must shun political violence', in *Newsday*, 3 April 2013, <https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/04/03/why-zimbos-must-shun-political-violence/>

⁶ Global Witness, Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Witness, Retrieved on 27 July 2012.

⁷ Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marange_diamond_fields, retrieved on 27 July 2012.

⁸ *Ibid.* Also see T. Chiremba, 'KP monitors jet in' in *The Sunday Mail*, (Harare) 6 to 12 November 2011, p. 3.

⁹ Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, Available at:

<http://www.coherentbabble.com/PublicLaws/S494PL107-99.pdf>, retrieved on 02 February 2012.

¹⁰ Senator Clement Aguy M. Georgios was the leading proponent of the anti-sanctions drive in the Zimbabwe Senate.

- ¹¹ Interview, MDC-T House of Assembly Member, Male, 25 March 2011.
- ¹² Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, available at <http://www.coherentbabble.com/PublicLaws/S494PL107-99.pdf>, retrieved on 02 February 2012.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴ The World Bank Group Sanctions Regime: Information Note, p. 4, available at siteresources.worldbank.org/.../The_World_Bank_Group_Sanctions_..., retrieved on 23 July 2012.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ¹⁶ World Bank Sanctions Procedures, (World Bank, 1 January 2011), p. 1, available at siteresources.worldbank.org/.../WBGSanctionsProceduresJan2011.pdf..., retrieved on 23 July 2012.
- ¹⁷ IMF Executive Board Uphold Sanctions Against Zimbabwe, Press Release No. 06/45, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr0645.htm>, retrieved on 23 July 2012.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹ The World Bank Group Sanctions Regime, p. 15.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ L. Nkato, 'Biti slams West over sanctions' in *New Zimbabwe*, available at <http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-360-Biti+slams+West+over+sanctions/news.aspx>, retrieved on 02 February 2012.
- ²² Interview, MDC-T Minister, Male, Harare, 03 December 2010.
- ²³ Interview, ZANU PF House of Assembly Member, Male, Harare, 13 April 2011.
- ²⁴ Interview, Former ZANU-PF House of Assembly Member, Female, Harare, 20 April 2011.
- ²⁵ The Global Political Agreement, available at <http://www.copac.org.zw/home/government-of-national-unity.html>, retrieved on 19 March 2012.
- ²⁶ Also see Zimbabwe's Sanctions Standoff, *Africa Briefing* No. 86, 6 February 2012, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/b086-zimbabwes-sanctions-standoff.aspx>, retrieved on 23 July 2012.
- ²⁷ 'Zuma blasts West over "unfair" Zimbabwe sanctions', in *Zimeye*, 27 March 2009, available at <http://www.zimeye.org/?p=3512>, retrieved on 23 July 2012.
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- ²⁹ Marange Diamonds Fields, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marange_diamond_fields, retrieved on 27 July 2012.

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