

Building State Capacity in a Post-Conflict Situation: The Case of Somaliland

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Abstract

This study examines the nature of Somaliland's state building process that focuses on building state capacity to overcome the fragile state of affairs in post-civil conflict Somaliland. The study has identified three key factors that could serve as a milestone for building the capacity of the state and have an important role to play in bringing state stability. These are a) ability to collect taxes and deliver public services, b) the capability and quality of political and bureaucratic state institutions, and, c) the security institutions such as police force – that helps Somaliland to be less fragile than the other parts of Somalia. The finding of the study revealed that using the above three important elements, Somaliland has managed to lay foundations for functioning security institutions, and government establishments as well as the provision of social services by increasing state revenue.

Key Words: state capacity, state fragility, revenue, security, institutions, Somaliland

1. Conceptual Framework

The term state is not simply an abstract idea, but it encompasses an authoritative and coercive apparatus and many other elements that enabled it to lead complex institutions nationally and internationally. As such, it is best conceived as the intelligible foundation for all decisions about how the various instruments of government can and should be utilized in order to achieve social goals nationally and internationally (Steinberger, 2004). State formation is not only about the creation of an efficient public sector, it goes beyond that including national and international transactions. It is also about society being encompassed by the state, and the state penetrating and structuring social relations. To a significant degree, this occurs at an implicit level. Citizens come to take the presence of the state and its rules for granted, and while they may reject or endorse a given policy or government, they do not question the state's position as the highest political authority (Gailey & Patterson, 1988; Pierson, 1996; OECD, 2008; 2010; Louise, 2010).

In fragile situations states are separate from society in the sense that they are often unable to establish themselves as the highest political authority and to penetrate and shape society; but linked in the sense that the boundaries between public and private spheres are in practice very blurred (OECD, 2010). In connection to that, their weakness, collapse or absence can give way to violent disorder and collapse of basic services, causing direct and indirect harm to livelihoods (Miller, 2005).

While the idea of the state is crucial to our understanding in the dawn of the twenty-first century both in political thought and practice, its worth first to disclose why exactly do we need a state? Thus, the philosophy behind state formation is believed to be as a shield to protect citizens from internal and external dangers and extend any social services to the larger community (Johari, 2006; Maciver, 2006). In order to carry out that philosophy, the state should have the capacity to implement its philosophy and obligations. Thus, the state needs to be both closely linked to and embedded in society, while at the same time maintaining sufficient autonomy to allow it to operate as the overarching authority responsible for making decisions that are binding on society as a whole (OECD, 2010).

Many authors have noted that the literatures on state capacity have produced a wealth of definitions. As observed by Edigheji (2007), the term state capacity is gradually defining as “the ability of the state to formulate and implement strategies to achieve economic, political and social goals in society”. Hence, state capacity is a multidimensional concept, and therefore, state's capabilities can vary across different functions.

Thus, state capacity in this context can be defined as “the ability of the state to act authoritatively to transform the structural basis of the economy to achieve economic growth, reduce poverty and income and wealth inequalities”. In other words, state capacity here implies the capacity of the state to foster inclusive development, including enhancing the human capabilities of all citizens (Pierson, 1996). Inclusiveness and social justice is, therefore, central to this conception.

In light of the latter argument, state capacity matters because it transforms power into capability and authority while it provides the basis for rule by consent, rather than by coercion. In fragile situations, a lack of capacity undermines constructive relations between the state and the society, and thus compounds fragility (Hersted et al. 2002). In this regard, the development of state capacity to manage competing interests and to be responsive to citizen’s needs thus has the potential to improve the legitimacy (Huma, 2011).

In contrast to the above mentioned concept, state fragility also is defined sometimes in terms of the probability of a major political crisis or conflict (with the emphasis on resilience/instability), and sometimes in terms of a lack of capacity. For example, the paper of OECD (2008) “Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations” focuses on resilience/instability, and defines fragility as “the state’s inability to meet people’s expectations” (OECD, 2010). Furthermore, in situations of fragility, non-state actors may take advantage of the state’s lack of capacity and legitimacy to offer alternative systems of government: for example, the Al Shabab in Somalia, an Islamist movement operating in the southern Somalia, the March 23 Movement (M23) in Eastern DR Congo. The emergence of these non-state actors show that if the state fails to incorporate other types of capacity and legitimacy that people consider to be essential, it will be open to challenge both on the capacity and legitimacy of the state.

In line with that story, although weak institutions are the central driver of state fragility, there are other factors that associated with fragility include: political and economic factors, violent conflict over natural resources or scarcity, among others. These multiple sources of fragility often compete and conflict, leaving the state unable to impose the ultimate rules of the game (Stefan, 2006; John, 2008). Nevertheless, it is believed that states whose political systems and institutions are in some form of transition are more likely to show signs of fragility or may be due to frustrated expectations amongst a population previously accustomed to higher levels of service delivery or more opportunity for political participation (Claire & Richard, 2009). Similarly, economic factors have significant impact on state fragility, but their effects are generally less significant than the strength of a state’s institutions. Therefore, economic development is not a prerequisite for preventing fragility, but a lack of growth will mean that institution building is more difficult than otherwise.

Consequently, states in situations of fragility not only lack strength, but also lack reach, for example, a nation state may comprise different communities that lack a sense of shared identities and interests or political community. Thus its diversity may lead to rebellion, tension or civil war (Blaine, 1991; Martin, 2006; Ali, 2008). In Sudan, for example, political opposition to the policies of President Al Bashir has given rise to a split between rich Arabs and the poor African Muslims in the western part of the mainland Sudan, the Darfur. The Darfur region, far from the national center, remained one of the most marginalized parts of the main Sudan in terms of provision of social services, economic development and degree of integration. The recently explored natural resources it contains have nevertheless made the region a politically contested area. As a result, the Darfurian people feel alien to the northerners’ way of life, while wanting to get the largest share of royalties paid by multinational companies for exploiting minerals and oil in their part of the country.

Regardless of these contending ideas over the concepts: state capacity and fragility. Capacity in this monograph means having the core features that enable the state to mobilize resources for key objectives, and is determined by territorial control, the effective exercise of political power, basic competence in economic management and sufficient administrative capacity for policy implementation (Jonathan & Rachel, 2011). Furthermore, understanding fragility and where weaknesses exist in a state’s institutions is important in building permanent capacity which is clearly the best option, if not an immediately feasible one (Hersted et al. 2002). Nevertheless, building permanent capacity needs to start early in the reconstruction process and move ahead in parallel with temporary arrangements that enable a quick start to reconstruction.

The aim of this study therefore, is to examine the efforts made by Somaliland in building the capacity of the governance institutions to overcome its fragility. The study paid attention to the three key dimensions that have been essential in building Somaliland’s state capacity and allowed it in maintaining the rule of law and provide its citizens’ social protection from any form of threats.

These are: a) ability to collect taxes and deliver public services, b) the quality of political, bureaucratic and administrative state institutions, and, c) the security institutions such as the police force.

2. Building State Institutions: Lessons from a Decade of Achievements

2.1 Revenue Generation and Public Service Provision

2.1.1 Revenue Generation


It is important to mention that revenue mobilization is a crucial issue for ‘post-conflict’ situation, while success in revenue mobilization is decisive to the chances of constructing a workable peace. Therefore, efforts to raise public revenues and to stabilize the public finances should be regarded as part of the recovery which leads the people benefit from these revenues (Addison et al. 2002). The most important thing that deserves to note is that, revenue generation depends primarily on three elements: tax policy, the revenue administration system and overall economic activity. Each of these elements is adversely affected by conflict while the major challenge is the weak state capacities for revenue collection from the local community due to the longstanding grievances over the locally conflicting parties (Gailey & Patterson, 1988; Pierson, 1996; Michael, 2007).

In connection to this context, state capacity should be defined as “the state’s ability to generate tax revenue from the public”. In this setting, state capacity provides the maximum tax rate that the government can effectively apply. In other words, if the government sets an excessively high tax rate, agents operate informally and the government is unable to collect taxes (Steinberger, 2004; Cárdenas, 2010). Therefore, limits to the taxes the government can impose are given by the bureaucratic and administrative capabilities of the state.

Given the emphasis on the above argument, several measures have been undertaken to restore revenue administration in post-conflict settings in Somaliland. The first priority was to establish the basic infrastructure for a functioning revenue administration, including physically sound buildings, equipments, telephone lines, and vehicles. Another key piece of infrastructure was a basic information management system able to produce revenue statistics and monitor operations. In this regard, an initial focus of domestic authorities in the country has been strengthening the customs administration, reflecting the need to increase actual revenue collections as rapidly as possible (Peter, 2009; Jhazbhay, 2010). As part of this policy, efforts to support the mobilization of domestic revenue have been undertaken in most parts of Somaliland, these revenues types including: taxes on services, income taxation, a tax on exports and imports and others (Eubank, 2010). Thus, as one dimension of the state capacity, economic capability of the state should be defined as the state’s ability to generate tax revenue from the public.

In line with that story, post-conflict revenue authorities in Somaliland have faced twin challenges – to generate increased domestic revenue to meet pressing needs and to build a system for sustainable revenue mobilization in the future (Jhazbhay, 2010). Nonetheless, as part of these efforts aimed at overcoming these challenges, Somaliland’s domestic revenues have grown significantly over the years. For instance, in 2006, it was about 27 million USD; by 2009 it reached 43 million USD as figure (1.1) attests.

Fig. 1.1: Actual Government Revenue (2005–2012)



Sources: Ministry of Finance (2013)


Table 1.1: Projected Sources of Tax Revenue for 2011 Budget

Description	%
Tax on international trade and transactions	46.38
Sales tax	16.08
Income and corporation tax	9.36
Other taxes (leases and royalties)	8.07
Income from licenses and services	7.12
Income from sales of goods and services	4.48
Other income	3.26
Tax on income from properties	3.03
Income from other government units	2.08
Fines, penalties and forfeits	0.13
Total	100

Sources: Ministry of Finance (2013)

According to table (1.1), the customs duties account for nearly 50% of the total revenue which constitute the largest source of income for the Somaliland's government. These are followed by sales taxes which contribute up to 16% of total revenues in 2011 (MoNPD, 2011). In addition to that, Somaliland has currently a complex tax system based on turnover and numerous presumptive (fixed) taxes on smaller traders. Therefore, over 93% of total tax revenues are collected by the central government while municipalities account for the remaining 7%. Local taxes include: taxes on real estate (rental tax and a levy on property supposed to cover the cost of sanitation services), license fees and various levies on contracts, property deeds, land sales, among others.

On the other hand, according to the government budgetary expenditure – in nominal terms – security dominates public expenditure accounting for 49.67% of the total in the 2011 budget as the following figure (1.2) attests, while staff expenses, operational costs, equipment, maintenance, fixed assets (new buildings) and general support dominated the remaining (JLPG, 2012). Apart from the increased revenue over the years, the Ministry of Finance sounds the weaknesses and gaps that hamper in raising revenues, include: weakness in the tax administration system, the need for a tax law, tax administration reform and development-oriented system of taxation, the dominance of pastoral and the informal sector in the economy which are essentially cannot be taxed and widely perceived corruption in the tax administration.

Fig. 1.2: Budgeted Expenditure for 2011 by Sector


Sources: Ministry of Finance (2013)

With the presence of gaps and institutional weaknesses in the revenue mobilization system in Somaliland, it is important to realize that projections and the information contained in the table (1.1) demonstrates the ability of the Somaliland Government to be self-supporting so that it may provide services acceptable to all citizens. In this regard, the government strongly relying on a local mobilized budget without international support, and its economy which is built primarily on pastoral farming and animal husbandry has largely recovered from the devastation of years of conflict (Berouk, 2009; Eubank, 2010).

In connection to this recovery, Somaliland has rebuilt many of the cities including: Hargeisa, Buroa, Berbera, and others destroyed during Somalia’s civil war, and its economy in much of the country is flourishing (Schoiswohl, 2004; IRI, 2005; Bulhan, 2008; Bradbury, 2008; Louise, 2010).

Despite this high degree of recovery and reconstruction both in economy and infrastructures, much of Somaliland’s economic growth has also been attributed to livestock production and trade, which is the dominant system of production in the country. Thus, livestock contributes to over 65% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and it constitutes the principal export of Somaliland to different destinations in the Middle Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Yemen markets (Berouk, 2009; Eubank, 2010; MoNPD, 2011). Though the livestock is the largest export, it deserves to note that the frankincense and other natural gums plus hides and skins constitute the second and third largest export commodities respectively, after the livestock.

Fig. 1.3: Exports through Berbera Port (2005–2012)



Sources: Somaliland Customs Authority (2013)

Though Somaliland exports livestock, frankincense, natural gums, skins and hides, on the other hand Somaliland also imports food and manufactured goods from various countries including: Ethiopia, Yemen, Brazil, Thailand, China, South Korea, Brazil, Oman, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, UAE, Japan, Malta, France, Germany, UK, and Italy according to the Somaliland Customs Authorityⁱ.

A major import from Ethiopia is the narcotic plant, the Khat. According to customs officials in Somaliland, in 2012 about 31,105,582 kg were imported, and the government collected approximately \$ 22.8 million in Khat import taxes. The Khat trade and its consumption play a significant role in the economy of Somaliland by providing employment and contributing significantly to the coffers of the Treasuryⁱⁱ.

On the other hand, the narcotic plant, the Khat remains one of the major setbacks to the country’s socioeconomic wellbeing and progress, and drains the nation’s scarce resources. It is not a surprising to say that Somaliland is the main consumer of Ethiopia’s third largest export commodity after coffee and oil seeds, the narcotic plant, the Khat. For instance, Buroa consumes around 54,500 US dollars per day according to the general distributor of the Buroa Khatⁱⁱⁱ. This consumption in one city in Somaliland is equivalent the supposed annual revenue secured by the Government from the Khat tax.

Fundamentally, Somaliland imports various goods and commodities ranging from food items, petroleum products, building materials, machinery and equipment, consumer goods, pharmaceutical, tobacco to motor vehicles, among others. According to the Somaliland Customs Department annual statistical report in 2012, the main commodities imported include: sugar, cement, rice, flour, fuel, building material and general cargo items. Nevertheless, there is a clear indication that a reliance on livestock exports is matched by reliance on imported food and consumer goods which means that Somaliland is import-dependent as a result of both preference for imported goods in particular food items and marginal grain production despite the availability of rich agriculture land.

In conclusion, although there are gaps and institutional weaknesses in tax administration as indicated earlier, it would be no exaggeration to say that Somaliland’s economy has undergone substantial improvements since the second of the half of 2000s. This economic growth has provided opportunities and capital investment for appreciable reconstruction both from the public and private sectors (Eubank, 2010). As far as the issue of capital investment concerned, industrialization is at its embryonic stage in Somaliland even though this period has witnessed the proliferation of light industries such as food-processing and fish canning plants, and bottled-water factories (Berouk, 2009).

Contrary to that, Coca-Cola has recently invested the first ever multimillion Coca-Cola plant in Somaliland; a \$17m bottling plant which is the biggest private investment in a country that desperately needs foreign funds since its separation from the rest of Somalia in 1991 (The Guardian, 2012).

2.1.2 Delivering Public Health Service

It worth mentioning that Somaliland has achieved a relatively significant degree of progress in certain social and economic areas in their own efforts including: provision of education, health and creation of a suitable environment for local investors who are considered the key priorities, as Somaliland authorities clearly believe that human development through teaching, building knowledge base, and providing training professionals will have an important role to play in poverty reduction and thus ensure both political and social stability (Berouk, 2009).

It deserves to note that, the health system in Somaliland is a composition of state and non-state actors, operating across all three tiers of state – at the lower end which are the health posts; the MCH clinics, and the hospitals at the upper end. Although due to budgetary constraints state service delivery remains a relatively small function of delivery, the Ministry of Health is the sole public institution responsible for the health care of the nation (MoNPD, 2011; JLPG, 2012).

Table 1.2: Public Health Care facilities and Personnel in 2009

Facilities/Staff	Number
Health posts	160
MCH Centers (Clinics)	87
Hospitals	7
Hospital Beds	1750
TB Centers	10
Public Mental Health Clinic	3
Doctors	86
Nurses	369
Midwives	89
X-ray Technicians	4

Sources: Ministry of National Planning & Development (2011)

The table (1.2) provides an overview of the country's health situation. According to the data available presented above, in 2009, health facilities for a population of some 3.5 million people comprise 7 hospitals, 87 health centers, 160 health posts, 86 doctors, 369 nurses, 89 midwives, 4 X-ray technicians and 24 laboratory technologists, while available public hospital beds were 1750 (MoNPD, 2011). Thus, the major reasons for the poor coverage of health services in Somaliland should be linked with the critical shortage of skilled personnel in almost all public sector health institutions, the limited physical access to the population to health facilities coupled with country's failure to acquire *de jure* recognition from any country or international organization.

With the existence of these constraints and inadequacy, provision of healthcare services – by the government and the private sector have increased and was one of the developments made since 1991. According to the data available, the maternal mortality rate was 1,600 deaths per 100,000 women in 1991, compared with 1,044 per 100,000 in 2006 (Irinnews, 2011). In connection to that decrease, the region's child mortality rate was 275 in 1990, falling to 188 in 1999, then to 166 in 2006, signifying a very significant decrease, when compared to world standards.

For a population of some 3.5 million, the public health care system is inadequately resourced by the facility to the population ratio to meet people's needs. Thus, despite the growing demand and limited service provisions of public health both in scope and coverage, Somaliland has made significant progress in terms of policy and strategy fronts. In 2011, the government has introduced the draft of the nation's National Health Policy which clearly commits in decentralizing the health services to provide further support for a more cohesive system to the society at the grassroots, in particular improve health care services for children^{iv}. This national policy however, increased the involvement of the private sector both for profit and non-profit in the delivery of health services. Today, all drug vendors and drug stores are privately owned, while the role of the private health clinics and medical services is growing in importance, particularly in urban areas (JLPG, 2012).


As far as the issue of health service quality concerned, the health service quality should be assured through better training and staffing of health care facilities, adequate and sustained provision of drugs and medical supplies, adequate budgetary allocation and improved management. Therefore, managing these factors could help Somaliland in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the health sector. These need further action coupled with sound policies, and closer coordination both with local community and international organizations, while substantial UN and NGOs intervention in the public health sector help the situation^v.

2.1.3 Providing Public Education

At the first glance, one of the aims of education is to strengthen the individual’s and society’s problem-solving capacity, ability and culture starting from basic education and at all levels. It deserves to note that, the current educational system of Somaliland consists of primary and secondary levels with eight and four grades respectively. The government provides free of charge education service to the primary level with an affordable amount of money to the secondary students (MoNPD, 2011). As a consequence of these policies, the number of students enrolled in primary schools, secondary schools and even universities in Somaliland continues to grow rapidly.

Until 1991 there were just 46 primary schools in Somaliland. Since then, education has expanded quickly with the number of primary schools arising in the academic year 1995–6 to 159, though with total enrollments of just 8,667 students^{vi}. Due to the overt peace and stability, in 2011, primary schools are estimated around 911 schools across the six regions of the state. In connection to this, one may observe that the secondary education is the fastest growing educational sub-sector in Somaliland due to the record enrollment at the primary level. According to the Ministry of Education, the number of secondary schools has moved from 3 schools in 1997 to 99 in 2012 (Ibid). Moreover, with the increase of secondary schools, the number of private and public universities has increased. In 1998 Somaliland had its first ever university, the Amoud University in the Awdal region. In 2012 the number of universities in Somaliland reached 21 universities according to the report from the Ministry of Education.

Fig. 1.4: Growth of Public and Private Education during 1997–2012



Sources: Ministry of Education (2013)

It is important to note that, a National Education Policy has been in place since 2005 and a National Education Act was approved in 2006. Furthermore, there is also a Somaliland Education Sector Strategic Plan for the period 2007–2011 and an Operational Plan for 2009. Therefore, the National Development Plan (2012–2016) remains the most recent policy document^{vii}. As a result of these policies and practices, and according to the Ministry of Education, primary education is Somaliland’s largest education sub-sector, serving the basic education needs of 170,930 children, across six regions. Increased demand for primary schooling especially after the incumbent government announced that primary education will now be provided free of charge for all Somaliland children has put excessive pressure on already inadequate service delivery systems^{viii}. Contrary to the government’s engagement in the primary education sector, there are crying voices from the public which emphasize that public schools’ quality is declining due to the qualified teachers who decided to teach at the privately-owned schools for their own benefits.

Thus, though the three levels of education in Somaliland have shown rapid quantitative increase, quality should be regarded as an issue that cannot be avoided with education at present. As far as the issue of quality education in Somaliland concerned, complex factors that have their own roots influence the situation such as the commercialization of the education aimed at generating money from fees, particularly in the private sector, human population growth, inadequate skilled and professional teachers, low payment for the teachers, among others (Mukhtar, 2012). Due to these factors which contributed their part in the deterioration of the quality education, low qualifications and competencies among secondary graduates have hampered the quality of the higher education. Due to these challenges particularly in the higher education sector, the Government affirmed its commitment to improve the quality of the higher education and established the country's first-ever higher education commission in 2011 aimed at introducing policies that safeguard the country's higher education system (Weedhsan, 2011).

2.2 Political and Public Institutions

Rebuilding institutions after state failure or overcoming fragility is much more difficult than rebuilding damaged infrastructure. It is believed that building capacity of the state is an enormous challenge, a challenge that requires imagination, cooperation and hard work among those seek to improve the conditions of post-conflict situations (EU, 2009). The complexity and fragility of post-conflict situations demand particular qualities of leadership, national vision, and a leadership committed to its principles to develop progressive and strong institutional framework. In post-conflict societies, due to the damage to its administrative structures, state is often unable to provide its citizens with a minimum level of basic services such as education, health and security (UNDP, 2005; OECD, 2008; Louise, 2010; Huma, 2011).

Following the Somalia's state collapse and subsequent breakup of its institutions due to the civil war in 1991 (IRI, 2005; ICG, 2008), Somaliland has crafted a number of important state institutions that ensured the nation's survival and facilitated its economic growth and sustain its established state institutions^{ix}. Nevertheless, the political system of Somaliland encompasses both Western-style and traditional institutions aimed to assert its authority, while tax revenue generated through the livestock export maintains a direct relationship of accountability between the government and the people (Daniel, 2011).

From 1991 to 1997, Somaliland endeavored to establish public institutions, develop governmental authority with limited international engagement through a series of traditional conferences aimed to establish political institutions which eventually developed with sufficient support to govern and contribute to the region's stability and political accomplishments. These institutions that evolved during that period survive to date (Eubank, 2010; Daniel, 2011; Mohammed & Ulf, 2008). The political structure that emerged from these traditional conferences contained a bi-cameral Parliament (Lower House and Upper House) that amalgamated both traditional and Western-style form of government helped Somaliland to build bureaucratic state institutions (Medhane, 2002; IRI, 2005; Hoehne, 2011). The Parliament's Upper House, the Assembly of Elders (Guurti) has become an indispensable force in maintaining Somaliland's fragile peace (Daniel, 2011; Harriet, 2011; Louise, 2010). In this regard, the most crucial point that deserves to highlight is the role of the traditional leaders plus the society at large which remained constructive for dialogue and nation building^x.


As far as the issue of state-building concerned, due to the successful political reconciliation and subsequent restoration of peace, Somaliland has undergone a remarkable political transformation by adopting an interim Constitution sets out a schedule for the legalization of political parties and holding democratic elections. To manage that, the late president Egal linked the transition to multi-party democracy with Somaliland's desire to gain international recognition, arguing that the international community would not recognize Somaliland's independent status unless it adopted such a system (Bradbury et al. 2003). On May 2001, Somaliland citizens voted in a referendum to approve the new Constitution. The constitution received the support of 97 percent of the electorate, a result that was widely seen as a mandate for an independent Somaliland (IRI, 2005).

Since then and onwards, Somaliland held its first presidential elections in April 2003, while it conducted the second in June 2010. However, the presidential election in 2003 was probably the most closely fought of its kind ever on the continent, the UDUB party candidate defeated his rival from the largest opposition party, the KULMIYE by just 80 votes out of nearly half a million casts (ICG, 2006; Harriet, 2011; Daniel, 2011). In connection with these presidential elections, the first district and parliamentary elections were also conducted on December 2002 and September 2005 respectively (IRI, 2005).

However, the second elections for the local and parliamentary which supposed to conduct in 2008 and 2010 were postponed several times due to reasonable factors, these factors include: disagreements among the contesting political parties, nomination of new electoral commission, registration of the eligible voters and others (ICG, 2009).

The following figure (1.5) clearly describes the figures secured by the three political parties those contested to win state power, the presidential elections conducted in 2003 and 2010.

Fig. 1.5: Voting Results in 2003 & 2010 Presidential Elections



Sources: Somaliland National Electoral Commission (2012)

As a continuation of the Somaliland’s path to democracy, on 28 November, 2012; the people of Somaliland went to the polls for the fifth time not only to elect their local governments’ representatives, but also to decide the nation’s three official political parties for the coming 10 years. Seven political parties and associations have contested the election. It is important to note that the KULMIYE Party has pledged during the 2010 presidential election campaign to amend the electoral act that bans the establishment of any political party except the three functioning political parties, the KULMIYE, UCID, and the UDUB. This amendment has attracted the establishment over half dozen political associations and parties those contested the 28 November, 2012 local elections. Thus, as an election mired by irregularities and fraud, one may regard it as one of the major setbacks that faced Somaliland’s road to held fair and free election.

On the other hand, during the establishment of the public administration in 1990s, the challenge has been to overcome obsolete managerial, technical and administrative cadres, which have suffered from the disruption of academic institutions, emigration of skilled human resources due to the repression of the military government and the successive civil wars (Jhazbhay, 2010). In the area of governance, the challenge has been hostility and resistance to the discussion of sharing power among clans in the issues related to the political arena.

Apart from these challenges faced the reconstruction of the public institutions, the Somaliland public service has been entrusted with the twin tasks of socioeconomic development and nation-building^{xi}. To ensure success, a series of administrative reforms or modernization efforts in the public service were undertaken. As part of these reforms, the Somaliland Civil Service Institute – a national center of excellence in Administration, Management and Information Technology – were established in 2005 with the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)^{xii}, while the capacity development remains the core and strategic mandate of UNDP Somalia’s program. Moreover, the public sector reform in Somaliland has been a part of the Government’s top priority agenda. Thus, the reform attempts to address the need to improve the quality of public sector management to generate responsible public servants and improve the quality of service offered to clients that would encourage the economic development of the state^{xiii}.

As it has been mentioned earlier, the Government took several measures to improve existing procedures and systems by introducing office automation and information technology to strengthen information and service delivery, and enhanced the capacity of district administrations. These measures include: realization of values and ethics believed to be critical for providing “quality” service such as honesty, discipline, integrity, accountability, and efficiency.

Nonetheless, the administrative reforms launched have been guided by the underlying philosophy of quality, with emphasis on administrative improvements, enhancement of information technology, improvement of information, and service delivery^{xiv}.

As the practices of the two countries demonstrated so far, and as part of a capacity building efforts, Ethiopia extensively helps Somaliland's public servants to empower its national institutions. Thus, under the funding of the Ethiopian Government, senior officers from different public institutions in Somaliland frequently engage in training programs at various civil and military universities in Ethiopia, such as Ethiopian Civil Service University, Defense University in Debre Zeit, Ethiopian Federal Police Academy in Sendafa, Jimma University, Bahir Dar University, Hawassa University, among others. The trainees mostly acquire different levels of educational programs ranging from undergraduate and postgraduate levels of education^{xv}.

Coming to the final analysis of this section, the concern for weaknesses in the administration should be linked with the absence of the public institutions accountability and transparency. This however, led in 2010 the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Agency to watch the officials, an initiative regarded as a government measure to increase public accountability, while combating corruption required major attitudinal changes (Freedom House, 2012). Since its establishment, a number of officials^{xvi} at all levels such as the Governor of the Hargeisa region, the Director General of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and the Personal Advisor to the Vice President among others have been charged with abuse of their position or departmental facilities for their personal benefits. The detention of these officials was believed to be as part of the government's continuous effort to ensure public accountability (All voices, 2012).

2.3 Security Institutions: The Police Force

Security governance can be regarded as a prerequisite for the other dimensions of governance. Without providing a minimum level of security to the citizens, the state is unable to perform its regulatory function (Jonathan & Rachel, 2011). In this regard, building the capacity of security sector plays an important role in conflict transformation and creating some of the essential preconditions for lasting peace in a post-conflict or in fragile situations (Terry et al. 2009).

Though it's not yet officially recognized by any country or international organization, the establishment of an effective administrative security institution and its continuous efforts to enhance peace and development through the police, military, and custodian forces remained essential (Adam, 1994; ICG, 2006). Without doubt, however, the role of international NGOs and UN Special Agencies are important that help Somaliland to capacitate itself in the areas of governance including: internal security and peace. Given the emphasis on that issue, the UNDP capacity development work has taken the form of an ambitious and creative local governance progress with a focus on building police forces to consolidate peace and stability.

From the above discussions, one can observe that the police force in Somaliland is relatively regarded by both the donors and citizens as one of the major institutions that maintains Somaliland's internal security with the presence of some institutional weaknesses, inadequacy and gaps that need to be addressed, including: low level of education, lack of professional integrity, lack of discipline and the prevalence of corruption and others^{xvii}. These weaknesses have been tackled by both local initiatives and international support from donors such as DfID and others committed to strengthen the sector which remains one of the prime priorities of the government's National Policy (MoNPD, 2011). In connection to the gaps and institutional weaknesses, there is also a lack of capacity within the Security and Justice Clusters that emanates from inadequate training and ill-equipped police offices, prosecutors and insufficient judicial officials which are also some of the problems that are currently experiencing in Somaliland^{xviii}.

It deserves mentioning that Police Reform project was launched under the funding and supervision of the DfID and UNDP respectively. This reform is aimed at improving how the state police can deliver services that are professional, efficient, accountable and trusted by the people as well as improving police-public relations. In addition, this reform targets infrastructures of the police such as police uniforms, vehicles, handcuffs, and other logistical equipments. On the other hand, the reform carries various projects including: training programs that mainly focus on human rights and police awareness to respect the citizens as many citizens complain about the police's disregard for basic and fundamental rights of the Somaliland citizens that was enshrined in the state Constitution^{xix}.

Nevertheless, after a long process of analyzing all fields of police reform, the Government in collaboration with DfID and UNDP proposed various projects aimed to implement the police reform. In line with the joint proposals, the Somaliland Police Commissioner and Minister of Interior have jointly signed a National Charter for Policing which they described as a “Blue print for the future” – a far-reaching statement of Purpose, Vision and Values that helps guide the professionalization and modernization of the Somaliland Police^{xx}. As a result of that bilateral agreement, Police Reform project would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Somaliland Police in key areas includes: criminal justice system, investigations, prosecutions, and crime prevention; police operations, human resources management and training; future directions, strategic capacity, and oversight^{xxi}.

In spite of the above mentioned discussion, the Ministry of Interior is another governmental institution mandated to preserve internal security, coordinate and control the police force, coastal police guards, anti-terrorism functions, immigration, mine clearance, etc. The major tasks are jointly performed in collaboration with traditional elders to settle disputes through customary and traditional mechanisms which remain the prime force for peace and stability of Somaliland^{xxii}.

On the other hand, the Government works with the other regional governments on the issue of security such as terrorism and piracy (ICG, 2006). As part of that collaboration, Ethiopia provides training programs to the Somaliland police force as well as the military that aimed at upgrading the knowledge and skills of the security officials of Somaliland^{xxiii}. These programs provided by the Ethiopian Government to its unrecognized neighbor have served as a milestone for promoting the level of collaboration between the two neighboring countries in various areas including trade, security, social and politics.

In the final analysis, it is important to mention that the government of Somaliland has allocated around 50% of the national budget to security expenditure aimed at empowering the security sector and the rule of law in Somaliland and maintain the existence of necessary institutions of governance as figure (1.2) regarding the budgeted expenditure for 2011 by sector attested.

Conclusion

Somaliland has been a self-proclaimed independent state since the collapse of the Somalia central government in 1991, by creating a widely accepted government structure and rebuilding basic state institutions, while it has laid a stable and secure foundation to support and sustain the established state institutions. In this respect, building the capacity of the state in Somaliland was and remains essential in promoting the effectiveness of the governance dimensions that can balance the interests of the citizens and public simultaneously and creates legitimate public order and generate policy coherence for equitable progress.

The effectiveness of Somaliland’s state rested on strengthening the central structure of the state and its political circuits so that its ability can penetrate deep into the society accompanied by a sufficient level of governance. This governance dimension has prevented the growing violence, structural and latent conflicts draining the social capital and the ability of the state to penetrate society, create authority, maintain security, facilitate service delivery and organize development activities. This means conflict resolution through traditional elders occupied a central place on the priority of governance reform and responds to the pressure for change emanating from the grassroots.

Internal actors engaged in peace and state-building paid great attention to contextual empirical conditions for sustainable economic, political order and peace. Despite an increasing focus on the field within the state of socioeconomic, political, peace and state-building, there are many non-state actors and institutions (business establishments and civil society foundations) that dominated reconstruction discourse which significantly influence, or have the potential to influence, both state and peace building processes positively as well as negatively.

In fact, more ambitious priority should be given to develop approaches in governance building that target at the long-term promotion of mutually reinforcing relations between the societies and established state institutions, and which are flexible enough to build on local resources and capacities. Nonetheless, in Somaliland, building and strengthening the capacity of state institutions should be long-term key priorities focusing on capacity which require more attention in state-building endeavors.

Taking as a point of conclusion, state capacity – for peace and governance institutions – should be understood as a development vehicle for a better basis in formulating suitable and effective state and governance building policies which are a formidable challenge to understand the sources and contested nature of building capacities in fragile settings.

Notes

ⁱ A data acquired from Somaliland Customs Authority.

ⁱⁱ *Ibid.*, 1.

ⁱⁱⁱ Retrieved from a HCTV weekly Program on Togdheer region, the program was dealing with the impact of the Khat in Buroa. Hargeisa, May 2013.

^{iv} Discussed in the Somaliland National Development Plan (NDP) 2012 – 2016, aimed for Full recovery and Rapid Development, published by Ministry of National Planning and Development

^v *Ibid.*, 4.

^{vi} Somaliland Education Sector Strategic Plan (2012 – 2016), from the Somaliland Ministry of Education

^{vii} Discussions in the National Education Consultation Conference organized by Somaliland Ministry of Education in July 2012, held at Ambassador Hotel, Hargeisa, Somaliland

^{viii} *Ibid.*, 6.

^{ix} Interview with Mohamed-Rashid Sheikh Hassan (Dr) in Hargeisa, on 20 August 2011 – scholar and former senior BBC commentator, the vice presidential candidate of the second largest Opposition Party in Somaliland (UCID) in June, 2010 presidential election, and the current Somaliland State Minister for Foreign Affairs

^x Interview with Abdirahman Yusuf Dualeh (Bobe) in Hargeisa, on 13 August 2011 – served as Somali National Movement (SNM) Press Secretary, Somaliland State Minister for Interior Affairs from (1991–1993); the Deputy Executive Director of the Academy for Peace and Development based in Hargeisa, and the current Information Minister of Somaliland

^{xi} Discussions emerged from the conference participants organized by Africa Peace and Security Programme (APSP) and Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University, held in Hargeisa in between 4–6 December, 2011

^{xii} There is a donor-supported project named “Somali Institutional Building Project” aimed to make the Somali locally-established institutions viable and sustainable under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This institute is part of that project

^{xiii} Interview with Mohamed Abdirahman Warsame, in Addis Ababa, on 25 April 2012 – senior officer at the Somaliland Civil Service Institute and currently doing his Master’s Degree Education at the Ethiopian Civil Service University in Addis Ababa

^{xiv} *Ibid.*, 13.

^{xv} *Ibid.*, 13.

^{xvi} Retrieved from the media sources and courts’ proceedings from the recent cases going on the Regional Court of Hargeisa

^{xvii} Interview with a senior Somaliland military official who requested not to mentioned his name, Hargeisa, on 4 January 2012

^{xviii} “Strengthening the Quality and Scope of Justice Provision and Policing in Somaliland” –A baseline survey funded by the DfID and conducted by the University of Hargeisa, Department of Law, Hargeisa, Somaliland on January, 2012

^{xix} *Ibid.*, 13.

^{xx} Joint program aimed to reform Somaliland Police forces organized by the Somaliland Ministry of Interior, the Police Commission for one hand, and the UNDP, DfID for the other, held in Ambassador Hotel, Hargeisa on April 2011

^{xxi} *Ibid.*, 20.

^{xxii} Discussed in the Somaliland National Development Plan (NDP) 2012 – 2016, aimed for Full recovery and Rapid Development, issued by Ministry of National Planning and Development, pp. 168 –183

^{xxiii} In various military and police training academies in Ethiopia such as Defence University in Debre Zeit and Ethiopian Federal Police Academy in Sendafa, there are numerous Somaliland officers both from the military and the police forces, provided by the Federal Government of Ethiopia training opportunities to build their capacities

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