

Past, Present and Future of *Hallyu* (Korean Wave)

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I. Introduction

Hallyu refers to the phenomenon of Korean popular culture which came into vogue in Southeast Asia and mainland China in late 1990s. Especially, *hallyu* is very popular among young people enchanted with Korean music (K-pop), dramas (K-drama), movies, fashion, food, and beauty in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Vietnam, etc. This cultural phenomenon has been closely connected with multi-layered transnational movements of people, information and capital flows in East Asia.

Since the 15th century, East and West have been the two subjects of cultural phenomena. Such East–West dichotomy was articulated by Westerners in the scholarly tradition known as “Orientalism.” During the Age of Exploration (1400–1600), West didn’t only take control of East by military force, but also created a new concept of East/Orient, as Edward Said analyzed it expertly in his masterpiece *Orientalism* in 1978. Throughout the history of imperialism for nearly 4-5 centuries, west was a cognitive subject, but East was an object being recognized by the former. Accordingly, “civilization and modernization” became the exclusive properties of which West had copyright (?!), whereas East was a “sub-subject” to borrow or even plagiarize from Western standards. In this sense, (making) modern history in East Asia was a compulsive imitation of Western civilization or a catch-up with the West in other wards. Thus, it is interesting to note that East Asian people, after gaining economic power through “compressed modernization,”¹ are eager to be main agents of their cultural activities in and through the enjoyment of East Asian popular culture in a postmodern era. In this transition from Western-centered into East Asian-based popular culture, they are no longer sub-subjects of modernity.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the origin of *hallyu* and its history from *hallyu* 1.0 into *hallyu* 4.0, to suggest future directions and a new perspective on *hallyu*. As Foucault says, “constructing reality through language” is the privilege of those who control power, isn’t it? So, the golden goose called *hallyu* can be conveniently dissected into four parts for export abroad: *hallyu* 1.0 (K-drama), *hallyu* 2.0 (K-pop music), *hallyu* 3.0 (K-culture) and *hallyu* 4.0 (K-style). However, the vogue of *hallyu* 3.0 or *hallyu* 4.0 on a portal site is not very long.² Such a cryptic (?!) neologism has been coined one after another, since the neo-*hallyu* 2.0 took the lead over the former drama-based *hallyu* 1.0.

II. Genealogy of East Asian Culture before the *Hallyu* Phenomenon

Before the encroachment of European/Japanese imperialists in the second half of the 19th century, Chinese-led “tribute system” was synonymous with the traditional international order in East Asia.³ Under the tributary system China claimed to be the center of the world. This Sino-centrism or *zhonghua* (中華) ideas was a product of cultural supremacism/hegemonism.

Accordingly, it refers to the tendency to regard Chinese culture as more ancient than or superior to other cultures.

¹ Since the mid-1990s, Korean sociologist Chang Kyung-sup has defined South Korea’s post-war development as “compressed modernity.” Since then, his theory of compressed modernity has been a key component in Korean studies worldwide. In effect, the degree of socio-economic change experienced by Europe over two centuries or by Japan in the space of 60 years was in Korea compressed in 3 decades; Chang Kyung-sup, “Compressed Modernity and Its Discontents: South Korean Society in Transition,” *Economy and Society*, volume 28, number 1, 1999, pp.30-55.

² Ultimately, *hallyu* 5.0 will see the spread of Korean aesthetics, predicts “SERI Forecast 2012.”

³ The tribute system is a widely used term in the studies of traditional Chinese foreign relations with surrounding countries including Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Annam, Cambodia, Siam, Malacca and Sri Lanka that were regarded as “barbarians and vassals of China,” offering tribute to the emperor of China and receiving titles and privileges in return.

This often involves regarding neighboring countries as mere cultural offshoots of China. But it is noteworthy that each country in East Asia proclaimed or vied with one another to be the center of the world during the 18th century, after the model of China: that is, “small Sino-centrism.” For example, Chosun (old Korea) insisted that Chosun people only could take over the Chinese civilization accomplished by Han Chinese, considering Manchu people, founder of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), as being “culturally backward.”⁴ By contrast, Japan maintained that the Japanese imperial dynasty “which had reigned since time immemorial (万世一系 *banseikkai*)” could be the leader of Sino-centrism. At the beginning of the 19th century, Vietnam also formed its own Sino-centric tribute system with surrounding nations. What’s more interesting is that the Qing dynasty attempted itself to reinterpret the concept of Sino-centrism by dividing it into two equal parts: Chinese scholarship and Manchurian martial arts. According to Yongzhen Emperor (1678-1735), the third Qing emperor from 1722 to 1735, Sino-centrism consists in the harmony of literary and martial arts. Anyway, the emergence of such emulous/individualistic Sino-centrism signifies that the traditional tribute system crashed down in East Asia. However, each country was passive, and even reluctant to forge a new framework for establishing a new regional order in East Asia. From the early years of the 19th century, East Asian countries - being seized with anachronistic Sino-centric narcissism - encountered without exception Western powers which relentlessly pursued establishing modern diplomatic relations with them, under the rules of “discriminatory” international laws.⁵

As stated above, West and East “discovered by the West” became two main agents of cultural phenomena, from the perspective of world history. To sum up, changing regional orders in East Asia can be divided into four periods: Pax-Mongolica⁶ → Sino-centric world → Euro-centric world (World system of Capitalism) → Globalism and Regionalism. In the late 20th century, the American global standard penetrated into a “vacancy” of traditional Sino-centric order. However, Western modern international order was not completely established in East Asia where tradition and modernity still coexist. Recently, due to the globalization, informatization and democratization, even post-modernism appears in East Asia. As the networks of non-state actors and authorities like multinational enterprises and international networks of civil society organizations emerge with horizontal networks among the states, the triple structure “tradition-modernity-post modernity” concurrently works in East Asia in the 21st century.⁷

Under the current circumstances, the *hallyu* boom is emerging in the modernized/industrialized East Asia where people with an economic power have a strong desire to be the cognitive subjects of their cultural activities. In this context, *hallyu* can be no longer considered a simple cultural acculturation, but a transcultural phenomenon or a process of “cultural power reorganization” through the complex/dynamic movements of people, mass-medias and transnational capitals. In particular, the adoption of “media liberation” in many Asian countries in the 1990s resulted in a favorable environment fostering the cultural exchanges of media products which in turn benefited the spread of *hallyu*. Nowadays, we can distinguish neither “our own” from western things, nor an original from an imitation. Thus, the stereotyped binary periodization “western imperialism vs. colonialism” and/or “the First World vs. the Third World,” hardly stands any longer.

In retrospect, Korean culture was a “moonlight” or “satellite culture” which received Chinese culture in pre-modern period, and then Western/Japanese culture in modern period. But in the postmodern period Korea moves from a receiving station to an “original office of culture.” This is the beginning of *hallyu* and its true meaning.

III. The Origin of Hallyuism

The vogue of *hallyu* is no accident. In the *hal* (韓) + *lyu* (流), the word “*lyu*” does not only indicate a trend of popular culture, but also a great wave moving from simplistic politico-economic ideologies into more different culture/civilization paradigms in post-cold war period. Thus, Korean wave (*hallyu*) is not a subaltern agent of modernity, but a main agent of East Asian popular culture, in parallel with Western-oriented popular culture.

⁴ The Qing dynasty was founded not by Han Chinese, who form the majority of the Chinese population, but by a Chinese ethnic minority and the people from whom Manchuria derives its name.

⁵ Yi Tae-jin, [in Korean] “The Future of East-Asia: Beyond the Historical Conflicts,” *Journal of Korean Culture Research*, vol. 35, June 2005, pp. 322-323

⁶ Some scholars mention the “Pax Mongolica” system, similar to today’s American-led globalization, which is assumed to exist before the Sino-centric world

⁷ Kim Bok-rae, “Colonial Modernity and Tourism in East Asia,” *Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews*, vol. 3 (1), February 2015, pp. 37-38.

It is not a hard power of “rich nation and military power,” but a “soft power” where people follow if only they feel good or fascinated with themselves. What K-pop culture “as attractiveness” captures the passion of Chinese youngsters means a “power shift” from hard power to soft power. Chinese want what their former generation of revolution and growth & prosperity wearing a Mao suit as a form of national dress didn’t give to them.



Figure 1 K-drama: Jewel in the Palace

It is just the motive power that pulls the trigger of *hallyu* based on the culture industry providing emotion and pleasure as value-added services. Also known as “*hanliu*” in Chinese, the term was first coined by the Chinese press in the late 1990s to describe the growing popularity of Korean pop culture in China. There are a large range of opinions about the issue of K-pop culture. Is it a culture or a product, or a “culduct”(cultural product)? Has it a high or low-level of quality? To the Chinese, the term *hallyu* has two meanings: (1) “*hanliu* 韓流” to signify Korean (cultural) wave/current, (2) “*hanliu* 寒流,” a current. The latter is opposite to warm current. It means that a wintry wind is blowing fiercely into mainland China. On the other hand, Chinese use another word “*hanmi* 韓迷” to designate the craze of K-pop culture in China. The English word “mania” is transcribed in Chinese as “*mi* 迷”: therefore, the *han+mi* refers to K-pop mania. However, if we consider other related words (with *mi*) such as “*milu* 迷路” (maze) or “*milu* 迷兒” (missing child), the Chinese character “*mi*” reminds us of wandering young Chinese people getting addicted to (decadent) K-pop culture.⁸ Accordingly, the Chinese view on K-pop culture inherently seems to contain an “anti-hallyuism.”

There are three theoretical analyses to explain the origins/causes of *hallyu* boom: (1) competence (hard power), (2) attractiveness (soft power) and (3) criticism.⁹ According to the first theory of “competence,” the *hallyu* phenomenon is based on the economic success South Korea achieved through the rapid industrialization in the late 20th century. In this light, *hallyu* is regarded as a symbol of Korean hard power/CT (cultural technology) which enabled Korean entrepreneurs/workers to make better cultural products. In fact, *hallyu* as a field of culture business has benefited from “Pan-Asiatic cultural production network” forming through Korean firms’ active marketing strategies and their partnership with local companies in Asia. In this regard, *hallyu* is not cultural, but economic/industrial phenomenon.

In contrast, the second theory insists on the “attractiveness” of K-pop culture inherent in *hallyu*. The “culture contents” in a magic pot named *hallyu* contain “Korean-styled development model” which has not only achieved democracy, despite its authoritarian economic growth, but also maintained dynamics of Korean civil society and traditional values (loyalty/filial piety) and so on.

⁸ It comes from an old Chinese mythic literal faith. For example, Chinese equate the character “*si* 四”(four) with “*si* 死” (death), or “*ba* 八” (eight), with “*fa* 發” (departure or development), according to the phonetic transcription. “Setting off fireworks during the festival” also originated in their literal faith, because “*bao-zhu* 爆竹” (fireworks) can be equivalent with “*bao-fa* 爆發”(explosion) and “*zhu* 祝”(celebration); Lee O-young, [in Korean] “What are targeting points the *hallyu* really wants to achieve?” *Shin Dong-A magazine*, (Serial number 549) June 1, 2005, pp. 96-97.

⁹ Kim Sang-bae, [in Korean] “The Attractiveness of *Hallyu* and East Asian Cultural Network,” *Journal of World Politics*, the 28th Series, n.1, Spring 2007, pp. 208-212.

In this sense, the success of K-drama “Jewel in the Palace” is all the more impressive,¹⁰ because it’s closely related to Korean intrinsic values. Before that, it is a commonly held belief that K-pop culture copied western culture. However, this historic K-drama (TV series) did wonders by interpreting East Asian/Confucian values, from Korean point of view. Thus, *hallyu* as attractiveness is not a mere commercial product, but a “missionary of East Asian cultural values” which has paradoxically become part of the origin of anti-hallyuism.

Indeed, the success of *hallyu* is not always positively received by people. For some critics, *hallyu* is not a result of qualitative excellence of Korean culture or its own peculiarity, but an offshoot of vulgar “B-cultural capital” in which all capitalistic desires and diverse conflicts are skillfully embellished. So, it’s almost impossible to develop *hallyu* as a big hit-business to lead a global cultural order in the future. According to this third theory of “criticism,” *hallyu* could succeed only in targeting an Asian “niche market” under the US-led global cultural order. However, *hallyu* boom didn’t originate in the domain of Korean traditional high-culture, but of contemporary pop-culture, such as dance music, rhythm and blues, funk, hip-hop songs of Korean idol groups. As a result, it provides affirmation of the power of K-pop culture we Koreans didn’t even recognize till then. It’s the attractive fruit of Korean-styled sensibility/creativity and competitiveness of K-pop culture which is growing further through free competition markets. It’s the second theory of *hallyu* as attractiveness (soft power) that can serve as a “hub” to create an East Asian cultural network, whereas forming an East Asian-level-counter-discourse” to cope with the US-led global cultural hegemony.

IV. From Hallyu 1.0 To Hallyu 4.0

As mentioned above, *hallyu* started with K-drama exports in the late 1990s.¹¹ However, it quickly jumped up into the maturity stage of *hallyu* 4.0 (K-style), by way of *hallyu* 2.0 (K-pop music) and *hallyu* 3.0 (K-culture). In the mid-2000s, *hallyu* was closely linked to Korean idol groups-led K-pop boom. Thanks to web 2.0, driven by social networking sites and the smart phone (mobile), the vogue of *hallyu* 2.0 (K-pop craze) reached the entire world, beyond East Asia. Even though *hallyu* 2.0 has been around for three years, another neologism “*hallyu* 3.0” becomes very popular on the web. Latterly, Korean Ministry of Culture and Sports is planning to expand a “cultural territory” through this *hallyu* 3.0, despite the downturn of *hallyu* in crisis, China’s on-line regulations, and Japan’s growing anti-Korean sentiment, etc.

The neologism of *hallyu* 2.0 or neo-*hallyu* was born with a yearning for Korean culture, such as Korean alphabet (*hangul*), Korean food (*hansik*), and Korean traditional costume (*hanbok*), beyond Asia.¹² The term *hallyu* 2.0 was used for the first time by Japanese media reporting widely on the showcase of Girls’ Generation who released their first digital single in Tokyo.¹³ The significance of *hallyu* 2.0 was to extend the range of *hallyu* from contemporary K-pop culture into traditional cultures like *hangul*, *hansik*, *hanok* (Korean-style house), and to achieve a “genre kill” with the global advance of K-pop idols in Middle East, Europe, North/South America and Africa. As expected, the early view from industrial and academic experts was very skeptical on the expansion of *hallyu* toward Europe and North America where the mainstream Western culture continues to be prevalent, but super-national interests in Korean culture have spread out at a surprising rate! The real motivator of this enduring K-pop’s popularity cannot be explained in terms of an industrial context or state support. It’s mainly due to super-national or hybrid characters inherent in Korean culture itself and social media outlets, as seen from the example of Perez Hilton, a famous American blogger, who was generating a lot of buzz by introducing the Wonder Girls’ “Nobody” music video. It seems reasonable to find the decisive turning point to *hallyu* 2.0 in the formation of “super-national fandom” with SNS (Youtube, Facebook and Twitter) which largely contributed to the worldwide spread of *hallyu*.

¹⁰ Starring Korean actress Lee Young-ae in the title role, it tells the tale of an orphaned kitchen cook who went on to become the king’s first female physician. In a time when women held little influence in society, young apprentice cook Jang-geum strives to learn the secrets of Korean cooking and medicine in order to cure the King of her various ailments. It is based on the true story of Jang-geum, the first female royal physician of the Chosun dynasty. The main themes are her perseverance and the portrayal of traditional Korean culture, including Korean royal court cuisine and traditional medicine.

¹¹ The Korean cultural products first penetrated the Chinese market with television dramas, *What is Love All About* (1997) and *Stars in My Heart* (1997), becoming popular in East Asia.

¹² Jung Hee-jin & Lee Gey-hee, [in Korean] “The Influence of Neo-*Hallyu* on Revisit Intention among Japanese and Chinese Visitors to Korea,” *The Tourism Science Society of Korea*, 34 (6), 2010, pp.249-270.

¹³ Han Koo-hyun [In Korean], “The Future of *Hallyu*,” *Korea Joongang Daily*, October 1, 2010.

Along with the rise of neo-hallyu 2.0, the original hallyu is developing to hallyu 3.0. The latter's aim is to expand Korean traditional culture around the world. Since the early 2010, hallyu has not been limited to K-dramas or K-pop music, but included all genres of Korean culture.

The Past, Present and Future of Hallyu			
	Hallyu 1.0	Hallyu 2.0	Hallyu 3.0
Period	1995~2005	2006~to the present	Foreseeable future
Diffusion Area	Asia (China, Taiwan and Japan)	Asia, North America and Europe	All over the world
Target	Media contents (K-dramas and movies) (Product-oriented)	K-pop idols· (K-stars-oriented)	Genre-diversification (Stars & Creator brand-oriented)
Cases	“What is Love? (1992),” ¹⁴ “Winter Sonata (2002),” “My Sassy Girl (2001)”“Jewel in the Palace (2003-2004),” HOT (band), Boa (singer).	Girls' Generation, Kara, Shinee, 2PM, and Big Bang (band)	
Early Distribution	Overseas Korean society	Online circulation (YouTube)	SNS
Media	Video, CD, spot broad casting	Internet, on-site performance	Cross-media
Durability	From several months to years (Winter Sonata)	For several years (Girls' Generation)	For several decades
Directivity	Turning the eyes of the world upon Korea (Tourist industry-centered)	Overseas expansion and performance	To the world beyond Korea (Regarded as mainstream)

Finally, hallyu 4.0 has the potential to be developed into a “K-style “that is closely related to the right of publicity.¹⁵ The spread of hallyu was all thanks to the affection of fans around the world, and the target of their affection was nothing less than the image of hallyu stars. All images assimilated to hallyu stars represent their identity. The right to commercially use their identity is that of publicity. As fans love and imitate the identity of hallyu stars, they get to like every style hallyu stars show. They are interested in the lifestyle (food, clothing and shelter) of hallyu stars. Thus, the success strategy of hallyu 4.0 depends on how to use and protect the publicity right of hallyu stars. However, these publicity rights are not well protected in Korea, birthplace of hallyu, on account of not having publicity-related laws and regulations.

For example, the above-mentioned K-drama “Jewel in Palace” had a 90 % viewing audience in the Middle East. “Winter Sonata” enjoyed incredible popularity in Japan. “My Love from the Star” gained huge popularity all over the China. None the less, Korean copyright holders (broadcasting stations and production companies) simply earned copyright regular incomes, but the related-product sales companies and online video sites in China, Japan, and other importing nations enjoyed economic spin-offs from the success of K-dramas. Thus, it's necessary for the sustainable growth of hallyu 4.0, not only to protect the publicity rights, but also to enact related laws to use them legally under certain conditions. As pointed out above, hallyu as attractiveness may well explain its critical success factor. In this sense, hallyu as an attractive soft power business can be summed up in a word “energy.” Korean energy can be divided into three kinds: universal energy (*gi*), intrinsic joy (*heung*)¹⁶ and care and affection (*jeong*).

¹⁴K-drama titled “What is Love” centers around two families with sharply contrasting values. One is conservative and patriarchic, the other modern and utilitarian. The drama comically portrays the troubles that arise as these two families become quarrelsome in-laws, while also delivering a message about the importance of balancing traditional and progressive values.

¹⁵The right of publicity is both a statutory and a common law right to limit the public use of one's name, likeness and/or identity, particularly for commercial purposes. The right is generally invoked in the context of commercial speech, when a company has used a celebrity's “name, likeness, or voice” in connection with a product, thereby creating a false and misleading impression that the celebrity is endorsing the product.

¹⁶*Heung* is a collective sensitivity where Koreans feel reconciliation and sense of unity through dynamical convergence and synergism *heung* energy creates in their inner world.

If Korean warm heart (*jeong*)-themed dramas belong to *hallyu* 1.0, cheerful joy (*heung*)-themed K-pop music can be affiliated to *hallyu* 2.0. Otherwise, *hallyu* 3.0 is the subject about Korean taste (*mat*)/style(*mut*). If so, what will be the subject of newly rising *hallyu* 4.0? According to *The Cultural DNA of Koreans* (2012),¹⁷ the answer to this question is a sound K-corporate culture. Korean leading companies (Samsung, Hyundai and LG) gained a solid foothold in world markets, but their global reputation is not necessarily positive. Because their business strategy is often short-term profit-seeking, without setting the pattern for others to follow in value areas, such as human rights, environmental protection and transparent management, etc. Now is the right time to change the cultural DNA of Korean companies.

Till now, our research on *hallyu* was, and still is “policy-driven” to predict and estimate its economic effects, while the factorial analysis has been ignored. There are a lot of optimism-driven speculations, without any scientific analysis on it. The empirical data are far from enough, so it is difficult to judge what kind of *hallyu* culture is strong in what country? Certainly, the dominant discourse on *hallyu* is distorted by commercialism, state interventionism, and ethnocentrism in Korea. It is formed or being pushed chiefly by mass media, government/business and some policy-oriented scholars. Korean government also shows more interest in selling *hallyu* products (export-driven policy), than in promoting the level/quality of Korean culture (culture promotion policy). Here, the state interventionism indicates that Korean government intervenes in the production, sales and distribution of *hallyu* products or support for them. Lastly, the ethnocentrism is skillfully concealed beneath a thick layer of *hallyu*.

However, the success of *hallyu* in long-term hinges on how well we form the “partnership” with other local governments and businesses in free competition market; therefore, we should have more positive and prospective attitude, vis-à-vis the openness of foreign culture and its acceptance. In conclusion, the future-oriented discourse on *hallyu* should not be left to the discretion of profit-seeking companies or chauvinistic political interest groups, but based on universal humanitarian values and ethics. Instead of selling low-quality cultural products cheap, it is advisable for K-companies to carry out vibrant and creative R&D on culture itself by making long-term investments. Some K-movies and TV dramas with violent/lascivious and anti-human contents tend to be exported at high prices as being considered high-quality cultural products, by simple reason that they gained popularity in Korea. For reference, Hong Kong martial arts movies, Indian love movies or Japanese dramas had hit Asia hard in the past, but they failed to be established as high-quality cultural products. Because Asian audiences fed up with their (poor) contents for the sake of arousing interest disregarded them. In this regard, some Korean scholars insist on the necessity of switching over to a “macroscopic goal,” such as the expansion of Korean culture through interactive cultural exchanges with East Asian audiences, beyond Western-centered cultural order, from a microscopic goal of creating profits by selling culture. So, it’s necessary to develop bilateral/interactive *hallyu* stressing the importance of “transnational communication” from unilateral “K-movie and pop stars-centered” cultural exports, and to form common cultural paradigms/motivations through the solidarity of East-Asian popular culture.

V. Conclusion

In the 21st century *hallyu* is still the most talked-about issue in Korean peninsula. For example, Korean government, business, mass media and academic world are competing for making the blueprint on *hallyu* for the future they want. However, we should consider *hallyu* as a whole, from the point of view of “the 21st century’s cultural world politics,” instead of presenting its fragmentary success and failure cases. Firstly, we should examine the possibility of *hallyu* in the context of East Asian/global culture politics. The rising of *hallyu* is a good lesson which shows “high stature of East Asian culture industry” in global cultural order. In this regard, *hallyu* can be a successful case of cultural transformation strategy by targeting a niche market in East Asia, in accordance with cultural globalization and/or decentralization of thoroughly pro-American culture production. It’s based on the premise that the vitality and sustainability of *hallyu* depends on its “attractiveness” and the “extension of East Asian networks.”¹⁸

According to prof. Lee O-young, *hallyu* is the first case of spreading popular culture through IT (information technology). Thus, we should, secondly, pay attention to culture transformation by internet media, in the way that Korea keeps ahead in the utilization/consumption of digital culture contents.

¹⁷Joo et al., [in Korean] *The Cultural DNA of Koreans*, Seoul: Amor Mundi Publishers, 2012.

¹⁸Kim Sang-bae, *op.cit.*, p. 208, pp. 231-233.

Finally, we need to introduce new measures to construct the network knowledge state, beyond the culture power theory, screen quota system or cultural hub state, in order to perform the world politics of both attractiveness and cultural network. Instead of narrow-minded “nationalistic” reaction to anti-hallyuism, the future strategy of *hallyu* is to develop a “formula of Korean attractiveness” to construct a Pan-Asiatic knowledge-based cultural network. This means a process of sublimating Korean standard into East Asian one in the 21st century’s culture world politics, so as to compete against the US-led global standard. Because East Asian-level “counter-discourse” cannot be realized without having an interchangeability with global standard.

Hallyu is now drawing “one Asian map” in East Asia where there is no cultural homogeneity that ties together this region into oneness. For this reason, some find a new seed of civilization in the attractive fruit of *hallyu*. It is amazing how Chinese, Japanese, South East/Central Asian people form a social consensus and a cultural solidarity through the *hallyu* songs and dramas. Furthermore, Korea, master station of *hallyu*, is not so strong as to conquer other nations by force. It’s the unique nation which never invaded the territory of another country. Therefore, *hallyu* is entirely different from cultural imperialism. Because the ultimate orientation of Korean wave (*hallyu*) is not a hegemonic cultural imperialism, but a “World wave” which harmoniously embraces all kinds of cultures in a global village.