

Kenya's Political Regime in Need of a Humanizing Pedagogy: what to Learn from Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed

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Abstract

Fatalism in the guise of docility is the fruit of an historical and sociological situation, not an essential characteristic of a people's behavior. It almost always is related to the power of destiny or fate or fortune—inevitable forces—or to a distorted view of God. The oppressed see their suffering, the fruit of exploitation, as the will of God. Submerged in reality, the oppressed cannot perceive clearly the "order" which serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they have internalized. Chafing under the restrictions of this order, they often manifest a type of horizontal violence, striking out at their own comrades for the pettiest reasons (Freire, 2005). Build on this thought, this paper endeavours a theorization into the Kenya's desire for a liberating political regime. The paper founds itself on Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed.

Key Words: Election, Liberation, Oppression, Pedagogy, Political, Violence

Introduction

This paper bases its discussion on the findings of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence in Kenya. The mandate of the Commission was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the post election violence that erupted in Kenya from December 30th, 2007 to February 2008, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and other matters. This report, commonly known as “The Waki Report” has been published and is available on major departments of Kenya Government websites. In sticking to the contents of this report, this paper observes that such a publication represents the Government of Kenya’s admission and concern of election related violence. On this ground, this paper cannot be taken in any form to be targeting any person mentioned in it, or attempts to contradict the laws of Kenya. In the report, it is further reported that the Commission felt its establishment was the optimal means to uncover the truth concerning post election violence and impunity in Kenya. For this reason, this paper finds the report to be the best authority and informative of political related violence in Kenya.

Commission of Inquiry Into Post Election Violence (CIPEV, n.d) points out that, sadly, violence has been a part of Kenya’s electoral processes since the restoration of multi party politics in 1991. However, the violence that shook Kenya after the 2007 general elections was unprecedented. It was by far the most deadly and the most destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya. Also, unlike previous cycles of election related violence, much of it followed, rather than preceded elections. The 2007-2008 post-election violence was also more widespread than in the past. It affected all but 2 provinces and was felt in both urban and rural parts of the country. Previously violence around election periods concentrated in a smaller number of districts mainly in Rift Valley, Western, and Coast Provinces.

In some ways the post-election violence resembled the ethnic clashes of the 1990s and was but an episode in a trend of institutionalization of violence in Kenya over the years. The fact that armed militias, most of whom developed as a result of the 1990s ethnic clashes, were never de-mobilized led to the ease with which political and business leaders reactivated them for the 2007 post-election violence.

Secondly, the increasing personalization of power around the presidency continues to be a factor in facilitating election related violence. The widespread belief that the presidency brings advantages for the President's ethnic group makes communities willing to exert violence to attain and keep power.

This paper argues that cases of violence during electioneering periods and continued agitations arise from oppression. Whereas there are efforts to change political regimes, those who get into power fail to bring the change desired by the electorates, thereby being in the oppressor-oppressed relationship. This way, the paper seeks to show the Kenya's political elite would benefit from a humanizing pedagogy, which is theorized by Paulo Freire in his book: *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

Root Causes of Political Violence and Oppression

Cases of violence during electioneering times in Kenya have many root causes. The Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence of 2007/2008 (CIPEV) enumerates and discusses how deep these roots of election are. These factors demonstrate how and why violence has become a way of life in Kenya, a country once known for peace, prosperity, and its potential for development.

CIPEV report shows that the first is the growing politicization and proliferation of violence in Kenya over the years, specifically the institutionalization of violence following the legalization of multi-party democracy in 1991. Over time, this deliberate use of violence by politicians to obtain power since the early 1990s, plus the decision not to punish perpetrators has led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of violence. This, in turn, has caused a further diffusion of violence in the country, which now is largely outside of the control of the State and its security agencies. Thus, violence has become a factor not just of elections but in everyday life. What this means in practice is that violence is widespread and can be tapped for a variety of reasons, including but not exclusively to win elections (CIPEV, n.d. 22).

Second is the growing power and personalization of power around the Presidency. This has had a twofold impact. First, it has given rise to the view among politicians and the general public that it is essential for the ethnic group from which they come to win the Presidency in order to ensure access to state resources and goods. Second it also has led to a deliberate denudation of the authority and legitimacy of other oversight institutions that could check abuses of power and corruption and provide some accountability, and at the same time be seen by the public as neutral arbiters with respect to contentious issues, such as disputed elections results. As a result, in many respects the state agencies are not seen as legitimate (CIPEV, n.d. 23).

Third, is a feeling among certain ethnic groups of historical marginalization, arising from perceived inequities concerning the allocation of land and other national resources as well as access to public goods and services. This feeling has been tapped by politicians to articulate grievances about historical injustices which resonate with certain sections of the public. This has created an underlying climate of tension and hate, and the potential for violence, waiting to be ignited and to explode.

Fourth is the increasing problem of a growing population of poor, unemployed and youth, educated and uneducated, who agree to join militias and organized gangs. These gangs have been alleged to intersect with parts of the Government and the security forces. These groups now have become "shadow governments" in the slums and even in other parts of the country and have been used by politicians to attack their opponents; to secure their own security, and to gain power. Furthermore, these proliferating militias also are said sometimes to dovetail with the State and its security apparatus thereby not only reducing the State's capacity to control the violence but also increasingly threatening the integrity of the State and the nation. This underlying endemic situation has created a climate where violence is increasingly likely to be used and where its use is increasingly unlikely to be checked.

The Use of Political Violence

According to CIPEV report, violence was part and parcel of the colonial state, which used it to ensure control in Kenya. After independence, President Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot and the stick to maintain power, with the use of violence mainly concentrated in the hands of the State, rather than outside of it. Opposition parties were subjected to political harassment and those individuals who refused to support the status quo experienced various types of repression and even detention without trial. Rallies, by students and others, were dispersed by the GSU using force. At the same time, individual members of the opposition were weaned back to the fold through appointments to Government positions, and allocations of land as well as provision of other perks.

For a variety of reasons, repression under Kenya's second President, Daniel arap Moi, became more draconian. First he did not start off with the same array of resources (e.g. land, civil service jobs, and a buoyant coffee boom) available to Kenyatta to reward his supporters and the general public. Second, in 1982, he experienced an attempted coup against him. This followed an unsuccessful attempt to keep him from becoming the President. For both reasons and perhaps for others, violence, including detentions without trial and the routine torture of perceived and real dissenters, became institutionalized early on under Moi's rule. This in turn generated a groundswell of dissent against his rule by a growing opposition movement, including politicians, lawyers, students, and others from all parts of the country (CIPEV, n.d: 24).

According to CIPEV (n.d), in the period leading up to independence and through to 1964 when KADU was dissolved and its members joined KANU, KADU had campaigned for a federal system of government known by the Swahili name of "majimbo", in part to protect the members of the smaller tribes from the numerical power of the larger ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu and Luo. To consolidate his base after becoming the President, Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin, through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and the military. Rightly or wrongly, these individuals given these were viewed by President Moi's opponents as not qualified or competent.

As the opposition to Moi's leadership grew over the years, civil society became increasingly vocal and donors increased pressure on him, including through the use of financial sanctions, to democratize. In the end, President Moi very reluctantly agreed to allow multi-party democracy in 1991 and he presided over two multi-party elections during his rule, one in 1992 and another in 1997. Although he agreed to multi-party democracy, President Moi did not accept the idea that through this he might lose the presidency. Thus, it was in this period in the 1990s that violence became institutionalized during presidential and parliamentary elections. Under the amended Constitution, to win the presidency, President Moi needed to win his parliamentary seat, obtain a majority of the votes cast in the country, and receive 25% of the votes cast in five provinces. In both the presidential and parliamentary elections, the opposition to President Moi and to the then ruling party, KANU, consisted mainly of non-KAMATUSA voters (CIPEV, n.d:25). Various reports covering elections held during this period alleged that high ranking political figures, civil servants, and others close to the heart of the Government organized and used violent gangs to intimidate people in areas of potential opposition support, most of whom were Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, and other groups. In CIPEV report, it is put that:

The strategy was to keep opposition supporters from voting and the means used was to hire gangs in the Rift Valley and elsewhere to kill people and displace individuals from their home areas so that KAMATUSA candidates could win and President Moi could be assured of obtaining 25% of the vote in five provinces, the majority of the votes cast for the President, and the majority of elected Members of Parliament. In short, violence became a means of securing political power and winning elections (CIPEV, n.d:26).

Elections related violence occurred not just in 1992 but also in 1997. In spite of the death and destruction that these methods caused and the reports from NGOs such as the Kenya Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, and two Government Inquiries - the Kiliku Parliamentary Committee and Akiwumi Commission - no one was ever punished for this wanton killing and destruction even though names of perpetrators to be investigated and those "adversely mentioned" were contained in the reports of both Commissions. The Akiwumi Report was not made public until 2002, even though it was published in 1999. CIPEV notes that:

This led to a culture of impunity whereby those who maimed and killed for political ends were never brought to justice. This changed Kenya's political landscape with regard to elections (...) reports implicated politicians as the organizers of the violence and killing for political ends, and noted that the warriors and gangs of youth who took action were both paid and pressed into service. Aside from this youths were sometimes Promised Land and jobs after evicting up country dwellers. However, it is not clear if they got either. A pattern had been established of forming groups and using extra-state violence to obtain political power and of not being punished for it (CIPEV, n.d:26).

Gangs and militias continued to proliferate all over the country, thereby increasing the presence of institutionalized extra-state violence both during and after elections, a pattern that continued to increase up through the 2007 elections, even after President Mwai Kibaki took over power in 2002. (...) Political gangs continued to sell their services of violence on a willing buyer willing seller basis (...) (CIPEV, n.d:26).

As extra state violent gangs began to proliferate and continued to be used by politicians, the political terrain was transformed. Violence trickled down into daily life and the State no longer commanded the monopoly of force it once had in a previous era. As such diffused extra state violence existed all over the country, where it could be called up and tapped at any time, including being used to arbitrate over elections as it has been doing since the early 1990s.

Once the Government itself used both its own and extra state violence for partisan political ends, it lost its legitimacy, was not seen as dispassionate, and consequently has been unable either to maintain peace and security or to reform itself (CIPEV, n.d:26).

The Personalization of Presidential Power and the Deliberate Weakening of Public Institutions

According to (CIPEV, n.d) power has been personalized around the presidency and this has been increased by changes in the Constitution under each President since independence. Laws are routinely passed to increase executive authority, and those laws seen as being in the way are often changed or even ignored. By 1991, the Constitution had been amended about 32 times. Among the amendments was the insertion of Section 2A, which made Kenya a de jure one party state until that provision was repealed in 1991. Even following the election of Kibaki in 2002 still rules were ignored within Ministries leading to financial scandals such as Anglo Leasing and others underscoring the once again the fact that the personal power of the President and his close associates trumped the law.

Individuals in various parts of Government whether in the civil service, the judiciary, and even in Parliament, understand that, irrespective of the laws, the executive arm of government determines what happens. Hence, the State is not seen as neutral but as the preserve of those in power.

The above syndrome has had various consequences. The first is a sense of lawlessness that has led to Government institutions and officials being seen as lacking in integrity and autonomy. One result of this in the 2007 election was the perception by sections of the public that Government institutions, and officials, including the judiciary, were not independent of the presidency, were not impartial and lacked integrity. Hence, they were perceived as not able to conduct the election fairly. That public sector institutions were seen as biased and unlikely to follow the rules increased the tendency to violence among members of the public. CIPEV, (n.d :) reports that:

(...) members of the provincial administration and the police also understood that it was sometimes in the interest of their personal survival to follow what they understood to be the directives or inclinations of either the President or MPs in their areas rather than to uphold the law. This led to some officials not following the law themselves, and sections of the provincial administration and security forces even engaging in acts of violence themselves (CIPEV, n.d:26)..

The second is the perception on the part of the public that given the power of the President and the political class everything flows not from laws but from the President's power and personal decisions. This also has led the public to believe a person from their own tribe must be in power, both to secure for them benefits and as a defensive strategy to keep other ethnic groups, should these take over power, from taking jobs, land and entitlements. All of this has led to acquisition of presidential power being seen both by politicians and the public as a zero sum game, in which losing is seen as hugely costly and is not accepted.

Hence, there is tendency on the part of a variety of political actors to do anything, including engaging in violence to obtain or retain political power, leading to what one specialist has called a race to the bottom because of a fear of being dominated by other ethnic groups and being subjected to the associated consequences of that. This has created a climate of fear and suspicions which politicians easily exploit and use to mobilize violence (CIPEV, n.d:26).

The attempt to reduce the personal power that had been accumulated by former President Moi initially was the reason opposition forces sought to introduce the post of Prime Minister.

This culminated in an informal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) before the 2002 election between the then opposition coalition under which the coalition agreed to introduce the post of Prime Minister after the election. Once elected, however, President Kibaki reneged on the MoU.

As soon as the MoU was scuttled, a group led by Raila Odinga left the coalition Government. President's Kibaki Government was perceived as being unwilling to abide by its pre-election agreement with its partners and as retreating into an ethnic enclave (...) Even though the MoU was not a legal agreement, the Kibaki Government's turning away from it and removing from government the group of Ministers associated to Odinga had the effect of increasing the polarization of politics along ethnic lines (...) With the ethnic political fault lines clearly drawn after 2005, and the need to win the presidency seen as paramount, tensions began to mount (CIPEV, n.d:30).

Land and Inequality

Kenya consists of 42 ethnic groups who live in eight provinces. Many areas outside the major cities and towns are relatively homogeneous ethnically. Problems of inequality and marginalization thus are often viewed in ethno geographic terms even though the inequalities between individuals of the same ethnic group are sometimes more pronounced than those between different ethnic groups and geographic areas. The presence of a large number of ethnic groups or inequality per se explains large scale violence. Apart from this, citizens every place are concerned that resources, including land, and services are distributed equitably and are quick to point out inequities.

Constitutionally, individuals may own land in any place in Kenya and in law no part of the country belongs to an ethnic group. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is de facto a characteristic of many areas, particularly as many of the newly created districts since the nineteen nineties have been ethno-specific, leading to the creation of ethnically homogenous effective "native reserves".

This in turn has created the notion of "insiders", who are native to a place and "outsiders" who have migrated there, a notion that has been tapped by aspiring politicians. This raises the question of the balance between group interests and the rights of individuals as entrenched in the Constitution, a problem that also has crept into slums (...) which are now informally divided into ethnically homogeneous zones (CIPEV, n.d:31).

Beyond the above, another issue that looms on the horizon is that some communities have done better than others which are poorer, less well developed, and more marginalized from the mainstream. This in turn has generated feelings of resentment and powerlessness, sentiments that can and have been mobilized violently. Furthermore, there is a large and growing underclass of urban poor who are not landowners and are unlikely ever to be landowners.

The tendency has been to think of Kenya almost exclusively as agrarian and of land issues as paramount even though the number of Kenyans living in urban areas is increasing, a tendency likely to continue (CIPEV, n.d:33).

Unemployed Youth

Although Kenya's population growth rate has been reduced and is now reportedly down to 3%, it still has an estimated two million youth who are unemployed. Furthermore, between 1992 and 1996, the number of street children increased 300% in just four years. Many of these initially rootless children who are now adults are the product of displacement by ethnic violence. They have grown up on the streets and are inured to violence, something that is clearly very dangerous. In addition, although many youth speak English, something that has raised their expectations, they have no hope of formal sector employment.

The combination of being rootless, having survived amidst violence, plus their need for an identity and a livelihood makes them ready recruits for violent gangs, which exist all over Kenya and are tapped by politicians, particularly but not exclusively during elections.(...) The gangs are devoid of ideology and operate on a willing buyer willing seller basis. (..) There is also a growing problem of unemployment among youth who are university educated, raising the spectre of whether these individuals will also be ready to engage in violence as well if they are unable to find work.

Violent gangs, consisting mainly of unemployed youth have been mobilized into gangs along ethnic lines. Their power, to the point of having become shadow governments in many areas, stems from two sources. First as the main aim of Government in the 1990s was to mobilize political support to gain and maintain political power, a good deal of revenue was spent on patronage rather than on maintaining infrastructure and providing social services. This crumbling as well as a decline in social services and security also paved the way for violent gangs which provided them.

This gave unemployed youth work, albeit within gangs, and made the latter extremely powerful. Over time these gangs operated as Mafioso shakedown gangs, with violence and impunity, as they continue to do. Increasingly, citizens began to ask who was in charge of Kenya, gangs or the Government.

While one might have expected that the police could have dealt with the increase in violent gangs operating as virtual shadow states in so many parts of the country, the Government has been ineffective in dealing with them for several reasons. First, many politicians themselves have used these violent gangs to decimate their opponents, to protect themselves from a dictatorial state in the 1990s, and to gain power then and now. This has itself given gangs a life and the ability to operate without fear of being caught. Second, by the time government was serious about banning the groups, they were large, controlled a number of areas, and continued to operate in spite of the bans. Third, security forces including police often were victims of these gangs themselves and used draconian but ineffective force against them.

What the Future Holds and the Need for a Humanizing Pedagogy

All of the above factors have dovetailed to make violence the method of choice to resolve a range of political differences and to obtain political power. Furthermore, because the violence surrounding elections has been ethnically directed, this has increased distrust among different groups and vastly eroded any sense of national identity. Hence, ethnicity has now taken on a dangerous and negative connotation. The basic issue facing the nation is how to deal with these issues. Attempts have been made to crack down on gangs and half heartedly to reform institutions. Neither has been successful, in part because the Government has not been serious, has not been willing to address generic issues or underlying causes of violence.

Furthermore, the main perpetrators of systemic violence have never been prosecuted. Currently Kenya is at a critical juncture. Violence is endemic, out of control, is used routinely to resolve political differences, and threatens the future of the nation. Because of the ethnic nature of the post-election violence, ethnic fears and hatred have been elevated in importance and could turn violent again even more easily than has happened in the past. What is required to address the points discussed above is political will and some basic decisions to change the way politics is conducted, as well as to address its intersection with other issues related to land, marginalization and inequality, and youth. Short of that, violence including that related to elections will continue to appear and will be ignited ever more readily. Kenya needs to decide if it wishes to let violence, corruption, and powerless institutions prevail or to introduce fundamental change. It is in this regard that this paper roots for lessons from Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed as one way enhancing political will and the way politics could be conducted.

Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed

Paulo Freire (2005) in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed discusses that while the problem of humanization has always, from an axiological point of view, been humankind's central problem; it now takes on the character of an inescapable concern. Concerns for humanization lead at once to the recognition of dehumanization, not only as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality. But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is the people's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation. It is thwarted by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and the violence of the oppressors; it is affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity.

The Oppressor - Oppressed Relationship

Freire (2005) argues that dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but also those who have stolen it, is a *distortion* of the vocation of becoming more fully human.

This distortion occurs within history; but it is not an historical vocation. To admit of dehumanization as an historical vocation would lead either to cynicism or total despair. The struggle for humanization, for the emancipation of labor, for the overcoming of alienation, for the affirmation of men and women as persons would be meaningless. This struggle is possible only because dehumanization, although a concrete historical fact, is *not* a given destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence in the oppressors, which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed. Freire maintains that:

Because it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity (which is a way to create it), become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of both.

Freire (2005) points out that this, then, is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed:

(...) to liberate themselves and their oppressors as well. The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, and rape by virtue of their power, cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or themselves. Only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both. (Freire, 2005:44).

Any attempt to "soften" the power of the oppressor in deference to the weakness of the oppressed almost always manifests itself in the form of false generosity; indeed, the attempt never goes beyond this. In order to have the continued opportunity to express their "generosity," the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent fount of this "generosity," which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is why the dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its source. True generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy the causes which nourish false charity. False charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the "rejects of life," to extend their trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so that these hands—whether of individuals or entire peoples—need be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they become human hands which work and, working, transform the world.

Freire (2005) observed that almost always, during the initial stage of the struggle, the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors, or "sub-oppressors." The very structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their existential experience, adopt an attitude of "adhesion" to the oppressor. Under these circumstances they cannot "consider" him sufficiently clearly to objectivize him—to discover him "outside" themselves. In this Freire says that:

This does not necessarily mean that the oppressed are unaware that they are downtrodden. But their perception of themselves as oppressed is impaired by their submersion in the reality of oppression. At this level, their perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole. (...) It is not to become free that they want agrarian reform, but in order to acquire land and thus become landowners (Freire, 2005:45).

According to Freire (2005), one of the basic elements of the relationship between oppressor and oppressed is *prescription*. Every prescription represents the imposition of one individual's choice upon another, transforming the consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the preserver's consciousness. Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines are fearful of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility.

Freedom is acquired by conquest, not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and responsibly. Freedom is not an ideal located outside of man; nor is it an idea which becomes myth. It is rather the indispensable condition for the quest for human completion (Freire, 2005:47).

To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity.

But the struggle to be more fully human has already begun in the authentic struggle to transform the situation. Although the situation of oppression is a dehumanized and dehumanizing totality affecting the oppressors and those whom they oppress, it is the latter who must, from their stifled humanity, wage for both the struggle for a fuller humanity; the oppressor, who is himself dehumanized because he dehumanizes others, is unable to lead this struggle. However, the oppressed, who have adapted to the structure of domination in which they are immersed, and have become resigned to it, are inhibited from waging the struggle for freedom so long as they feel incapable of running the risks it requires. Moreover, their struggle for freedom threatens not only the oppressor, but also their own oppressed comrades who are fearful of still greater repression. When they discover within themselves the yearning to be free, they perceive that this yearning can be transformed into reality only when the same yearning is aroused in their comrades.

But while dominated by the fear of freedom they refuse to appeal to others, or to listen to the appeals of others, or even to the appeals of their own conscience. They prefer gregariousness to authentic comradeship; they prefer the security of conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by freedom and even the very pursuit of freedom (Freire, 2005:48).

Freire (2005) argues that the oppressed suffer from the duality which has established itself in their innermost being. They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet, although they desire authentic existence, they fear it. They are at one and the same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have internalized. The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or being divided; between ejecting the oppressor within or not ejecting them; between human solidarity or alienation; between following prescriptions or having choices; between being spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting through the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent, castrated in their power to create and re-create, in their power to transform the world. This is the tragic dilemma of the oppressed which their education must take into account.

The Pedagogy of the Oppressed

The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for their critical discovery that both oppressed and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization. In propounding the pedagogy of the oppressed, Freire (2005) addresses the central problem of the oppressed, as divided and unauthentic beings can participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation. Freire argues that it is only when the oppressed discover themselves to be "hosts" of the oppressor that can they contribute to the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy. But, as long as they live in the duality in which *to be* is *to be like*, and *to be like* is *to be like the oppressor*, this contribution is impossible.

In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. This perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the motivating force for liberating action. Nor does the discovery by the oppressed that they exist in dialectical relationship to the oppressor, as his antithesis—that without them the oppressor could not exist—in itself constitute liberation. The oppressed can overcome the contradiction in which they are caught only when this perception enlists them in the struggle to free themselves.

Since it is a concrete situation that the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is established, the resolution of this contradiction must be *objectively* verifiable. Hence, the radical requirement—both for the individual who discovers himself or herself to be an oppressor and for the oppressed—that the concrete situation which begets oppression must be transformed. To present this radical demand for the objective transformation of reality, to combat subjectivist immobility which would divert the recognition of oppression into patient waiting for oppression to disappear by itself, is not to dismiss the role of subjectivity in the struggle to change structures. On the contrary, one cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the other, nor can they be dichotomized.

The separation of objectivity from subjectivity, the denial of the latter when analyzing reality or acting upon it, is objectivism. On the other hand, the denial of objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism which leads to solipsistic positions, denies action itself by denying objective reality. Neither objectivism nor subjectivism, nor yet psychologism is propounded here, but rather subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical relationship (Freire, 2005:50).

To deny the importance of subjectivity in the process of transforming the world and history is naive and simplistic. It is to admit the impossible: a world without people. This objectivistic position is as ingenuous as that of subjectivism, which postulates people without a world. World and human beings do not exist apart from each other, they exist in constant interaction. Reality which becomes oppressive results in the contradistinction of men as oppressors and oppressed. The latter, whose task it is to struggle for their liberation together with those who show true solidarity, must acquire a critical awareness of oppression through the praxis of this struggle.

One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge human beings consciousness. Functionally, oppression is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force, one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it (Freire, 2005:51).

Making "real oppression more oppressive still by adding to it the realization of oppression" corresponds to the dialectical relation between the subjective and the objective. Only in this interdependence is an authentic praxis possible, without which it is impossible to resolve the oppressor-oppressed contradiction. To achieve this goal, the oppressed must confront reality critically, simultaneously objectifying and acting upon that reality.

A mere perception of reality not followed by this critical intervention will not lead to a transformation of objective reality—precisely because it is not a true perception. This is the case of a purely subjectivist perception by someone who forsakes objective reality and creates a false substitute (Freire, 2005:52).

Freire teaches that a different type of false perception occurs when a change in objective reality would threaten the individual or class interests of the perceiver. In the first instance, there is no critical intervention in reality because that reality is fictitious; there is none in the second instance because intervention would contradict the class interests of the perceiver. In the latter case the tendency of the perceiver is to behave "neurotically." The fact exists; but both the fact and what may result from it may be prejudicial to the person. Thus it becomes necessary, not precisely to deny the fact, but to "see it differently." This rationalization as a defense mechanism coincides in the end with subjectivism. In dialectical thought, world and action are intimately interdependent. But action is human only when it is not merely an occupation but also a preoccupation, that is, when it is not dichotomized from reflection. The requirement is seen not in terms of explaining to, but rather dialoguing with the people about their actions. The pedagogy of the oppressed, which is the pedagogy of people engaged in the fight for their own liberation, has its roots here.

Freire (2005) argues that the pedagogy of the oppressed, animated by authentic, humanist (not humanitarian) generosity, presents itself as a pedagogy of humankind. Pedagogy which begins with the egoistic interests of the oppressors (an egoism cloaked in the false generosity of paternalism) and makes of the oppressed the objects of its humanitarianism, itself maintains and embodies oppression. It is an instrument of dehumanization.

The Stages of the Pedagogy of the Oppressed

The pedagogy of the oppressed, as a humanist and libertarian pedagogy, has two distinct stages. In the first, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation. In the second stage, in which *the* reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all people in the process of permanent liberation. In both stages, it is always through action in depth that the culture of domination is culturally confronted. In the first stage this confrontation occurs through the change in the way the oppressed perceive the world of oppression; in the second stage, through the expulsion of the myths created and developed in the old order, which like specters haunt the new structure emerging from the revolutionary transformation.

The pedagogy of the first stage must deal with the problem of the oppressed consciousness and the oppressor consciousness, the problem of men and women who oppress and men and women who suffer oppression. It must take into account their behavior, their view of the world, and their ethics. A particular problem is the duality of the oppressed: they are contradictory, divided beings, shaped by and existing in a concrete situation of oppression and violence (Freire, 2005:55).

According to Freire (2005), any situation in which "A" objectively exploits "B" or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes with the individual's ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human. With the establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has *already* begun. Never in history has violence been initiated by the oppressed. There would be no oppressed had there been no prior situation of violence to establish their subjugation. Freire (2005) points out that:

Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons—not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and unrecognized. It is not the unloved who initiate disaffection, but those who cannot love because they love only themselves. It is not the helpless, subject to terror, who initiate terror, but the violent, who with their power create the concrete situation which begets the "rejects of life." It is not the tyrannized who initiate despotism, but the tyrants. It is not the despised who initiate hatred, but those who despise. It is not those whose humanity is denied them who negate humankind, but those who denied that humanity (thus negating their own as well). Force is used not by those who have become weak under the preponderance of the strong, but by the strong who have emasculated them (Freire, 2005:55).

Consciously or unconsciously, the act of rebellion by the oppressed can initiate love. Whereas the violence of the oppressors prevents the oppressed from being fully human, the response of the latter to this violence is grounded in the desire to pursue the right to be human. As the oppressors dehumanize others and violate their rights, they themselves also become dehumanized. As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors power to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppression.

It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors. The latter, as an oppressive class, can free neither others nor themselves. It is therefore essential that the oppressed wage the struggle to resolve the contradiction in which they are caught; and the contradiction will be resolved by the appearance of the new man: neither oppressor nor oppressed, but man in the process of liberation. If the goal of the oppressed is to become fully human, they will not achieve their goal by merely reversing the terms of the contradiction, by simply changing poles (Freire, 2005:56).

Resolution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction indeed implies the disappearance of the oppressors as a dominant class. However, the restraints imposed by the former oppressed on their oppressors, so that the latter cannot reassume their former position, do not constitute *oppression*. An act is oppressive only when it prevents people from being more fully human. Accordingly, these necessary restraints do not *in themselves* signify that yesterdays oppressed have become today's oppressors. Acts which prevent the restoration of the oppressive regime cannot be compared with those which create and maintain it, cannot be compared with those by which a few men and women deny the majority their right to be human.

However, the moment the new regime hardens into a dominating bureaucracy the humanist dimension of the struggle is lost and it is no longer possible to speak of liberation.

(...) the authentic solution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction does not lie in a mere reversal of position, in moving from one pole to the other. Nor does it lie in the replacement of the former oppressors with new ones who continue to subjugate the oppressed—all in the name of their liberation (Freire, 2005:57).

But even when the contradiction is resolved authentically by a new situation established by the liberated laborers, the former oppressors do not feel liberated. On the contrary, they genuinely consider themselves to be oppressed. Conditioned by the experience of oppressing others, any situation other than their former seems to them like oppression. Freire (2005) mentions that:

Formerly, they could eat, dress, wear shoes, be educated, travel (...) while millions did not eat, had no clothes or shoes, neither studied nor traveled (...) Any restriction on this way of life, in the name of the rights of the community, appears to the former oppressors as a profound violation of their individual rights—although they had no respect for the millions who suffered and died of hunger, pain, sorrow, and despair (Freire, 2005:57).

This way of understanding the world and people (which necessarily makes the oppressors resist the installation of a new regime) is explained by their experience as a dominant class. Once a situation of violence and oppression has been established, it engenders an entire way of life and behavior for those caught up in it—oppressors and oppressed alike. This violence, as a process, is perpetuated from generation to generation of oppressors, who become its heirs and are shaped in its climate.

This climate creates in the oppressor a strongly possessive consciousness—possessive of the world and of men and women. Apart from direct, concrete, material possession of the world and of people, the oppressor consciousness could not understand itself—could not even exist (Freire, 2005:58).

In their unrestrained eagerness to possess, the oppressors develop the conviction that it is possible for them to transform everything into objects of their purchasing power; hence their strictly materialistic concept of existence. For the oppressors, what is worthwhile is to have more—always more—even at the cost of the oppressed having less or having nothing. For them, *to be is to have* and to be the class of the "haves." As beneficiaries of a situation of oppression, the oppressors cannot perceive that if *having* is a condition of *being*, it is a necessary condition for all women and men. This is why their generosity is false. Humanity is a "thing," and they possess it as an exclusive right, as inherited property. To the oppressor consciousness, the humanization of the "others," of the people, appears not as the pursuit of full humanity, but as subversion.

The oppressors do not perceive their monopoly on *having more* as a privilege which dehumanizes others and themselves. They cannot see that, in the egoistic pursuit of *having* as a possessing class, they suffocate in their own possessions and no longer *are*; they merely *have*. For them, *having more* is an inalienable right, a right they acquired through their own "effort," with their "courage to take risks." If others do not have more, it is because they are incompetent and lazy, and worst of all is their unjustifiable ingratitude towards the "generous gestures" of the dominant class. Precisely because they are "ungrateful" and "envious," the oppressed are regarded as potential enemies who must be watched.

The pleasure in complete domination over another person (or other animate creature) is the very essence of the sadistic drive. Another way of formulating the same thought is to say that the aim of sadism is to transform a man into a thing, something animate into something inanimate, since by complete and absolute control the living loses one essential quality of life—freedom. Sadistic love is a perverted love—a love of death, not of life. One of the characteristics of the oppressor consciousness and its necrophilic view of the world is thus sadism. As the oppressor consciousness, in order to dominate, tries to deter the drive to search, the restlessness, and the creative power which characterize life, it kills life. More and more, the oppressors are using science and technology as unquestionably powerful instruments for their purpose: the maintenance of the oppressive order through manipulation and repression. The oppressed, as objects, as "things," have no purposes except those their oppressors prescribe for them.

Freire (2005) observes that in the process of fighting oppression, certain members of the oppressor class join the oppressed in their struggle for liberation, thus moving from one pole of the contradiction to the other. It happens, however, that as they cease to be exploiters or indifferent spectators or simply the heirs of exploitation and move to the side of the exploited, they almost always bring with them the marks of their origin: their prejudices and their deformations, which include a lack of confidence in the people's ability to think, to want, and to know. Accordingly, these adherents to the people's cause constantly run the risk of falling into a type of generosity as malefic as that of the oppressors. The generosity of the oppressors is nourished by an unjust order, which must be maintained in order to justify that generosity. Those who authentically commit themselves to the people must re-examine themselves constantly. This conversion is so radical as not to allow of ambiguous behavior. To affirm this commitment but to consider oneself the proprietor of revolutionary wisdom—which must then be given to (or imposed on) the people—is to retain the old ways.

The man or woman who proclaims devotion to the cause of liberation yet is unable to enter into *communion* with the people, whom he or she continues to regard as totally ignorant, is grievously self-deceived. The convert who approaches the people but feels alarm at each step they take, each doubt they express, and each suggestion they offer, and attempts to impose his "status," remains nostalgic towards his origins (Freire, 2005:61).

According to Freire (2005) conversion to the people requires a profound rebirth. Those who undergo it must take on a new form of existence; they can no longer remain as they were. Only through comradeship with the oppressed can the converts understand their characteristic ways of living and behaving, which in diverse moments reflect the structure of domination. Accordingly, until they concretely "discover" their oppressor and in turn their own consciousness, they nearly always express fatalistic attitudes towards their situation.

Fatalism in the guise of docility is the fruit of an historical and sociological situation, not an essential characteristic of a people's behavior. It almost always is related to the power of destiny or fate or fortune—inevitable forces—or to a distorted view of God. The oppressed see their suffering, the fruit of exploitation, as the will of God.

Submerged in reality, the oppressed cannot perceive clearly the "order" which serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they have internalized. Chafing under the restrictions of this order, they often manifest a type of horizontal violence, striking out at their own comrades for the pettiest reasons (Freire, 2005:62).

At a certain point in their existential experience the oppressed feel an irresistible attraction towards the oppressors and their way of life. Sharing this way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In their alienation, the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressors, to imitate them, to follow them.

The oppressed must see examples of the vulnerability of the oppressor so that a contrary conviction can begin to grow within them. Until this occurs, they will continue disheartened, fearful, and beaten. As long as the oppressed remain unaware of the causes of their condition, they fatalistically "accept" their exploitation. Further, they are apt to react in a passive and alienated manner when confronted with the necessity to struggle for their freedom and self-affirmation. Little by little, however, they tend to try out forms of rebellious action.

In working towards liberation, one must neither lose sight of this passivity nor overlook the moment of awakening. Within their unauthentic view of the world and of themselves, the oppressed feel like "things" owned by the oppressor. For the latter, *to be* is *to have*, almost always at the expense of those who have nothing. For the oppressed, at a certain point in their existential experience, *to be* is not to resemble the oppressor, but *to be under him*, to depend on him. Accordingly, the oppressed are emotionally dependent (Freire, 2005:64).

A Humanizing Pedagogy: Critical and liberating dialogue

Critical and liberating dialogue, which presupposes action, must be carried on with the oppressed at whatever the stage of their struggle for liberation. The content of that dialogue can and should vary in accordance with historical conditions and the level at which the oppressed perceive reality. But to substitute monologue, slogans, and communiques for dialogue is to attempt to liberate the oppressed with the instruments of domestication.

Attempting to liberate the oppressed without their reflective participation in the act of liberation is to treat them as objects which must be saved from a burning building; it is to lead them into the populist pitfall and transform them into masses which can be manipulated (Freire, 2005:65).

At all stages of their liberation, the oppressed must see themselves as women and men engaged in the ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human. Reflection and action become imperative when one does not erroneously attempt to dichotomize the content of humanity from its historical forms. The insistence that the oppressed engage in reflection on their concrete situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflection—true reflection—leads to action. On the other hand, when the situation calls for action, that action will constitute an authentic praxis only if its consequences become the object of critical reflection. In this sense, the praxis is the new *raison d'être* of the oppressed; and the revolution, which inaugurates the historical moment of this *raison d'être*, is not viable apart from their concomitant conscious involvement. Otherwise, action is pure activism. To achieve this praxis, however, it is necessary to trust in the oppressed and in their ability to reason. Whoever lacks this trust will fail to initiate (or will abandon) dialogue, reflection, and communication, and will fall into using slogans, communiques, monologues, and instructions. Superficial conversions to the cause of liberation carry this danger. Political action on the side of the oppressed must be pedagogical action in the authentic sense of the word, and, therefore, action *with* the oppressed.

Those who work for liberation must not take advantage of the emotional dependence of the oppressed—dependence that is the fruit of the concrete situation of domination which surrounds them and which engendered their unauthentic view of the world. Using their dependence to create still greater dependence is an oppressor tactic. Libertarian action must recognize this dependence as a weak point and must attempt through reflection and action to transform it into independence. However, not even the best-intentioned leadership can bestow independence as a gift. The liberation of the oppressed is a liberation of women and men, not things. Accordingly, while no one liberates himself by his own efforts alone, neither is he liberated by others. Liberation, a human phenomenon, cannot be achieved by semi-humans. Any attempt to treat people as semi-humans only dehumanizes them. When people are already dehumanized, due to the oppression they suffer, the process of their liberation must not employ the methods of dehumanization.

The correct method for a revolutionary leadership lies in dialogue. The conviction of the oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary leadership, but the result of their own conscience. The revolutionary leaders must realize that their own conviction of the necessity for struggle was not given to them by anyone else—if it is authentic. This conviction cannot be packaged and sold; it is reached, rather, by means of a totality of reflection and action. Likewise, the oppressed (who do not commit themselves to the struggle unless they are convinced, and who, if they do not make such a commitment, withhold the indispensable conditions for this struggle) must reach this conviction as Subjects, not as objects. They also must intervene critically in the situation which surrounds them and whose mark they bear; propaganda cannot achieve this. While the conviction of the necessity for struggle is indispensable to the revolutionary leadership it is also necessary for the oppressed.

Freire (2005) discusses that it is essential for the oppressed to realize that when they accept the struggle for humanization they also accept, from that moment, their total responsibility for the struggle. They must realize that they are fighting not merely for freedom from hunger, but for

(...) freedom to create and to construct, to wonder and to venture. Such freedom requires that the individual be active and responsible, not a slave or a well-fed cog in the machine (...).

The oppressed, who have been shaped by the death-affirming climate of oppression, must find through their struggle the way to life-affirming humanization, which does not lie *simply* in having more to eat. The oppressed have been destroyed precisely because their situation has reduced them to things. In order to regain their humanity they must cease to be things and fight as men and women. This is a radical requirement. They cannot enter the struggle as objects in order *later* to become human beings.

The struggle begins with men's recognition that they have been destroyed. Propaganda, management, manipulation—all arms of domination—cannot be the instruments of their re-humanization. The only effective instrument is a humanizing pedagogy in which the revolutionary leadership establishes a permanent relationship of dialogue with the oppressed. In a humanizing pedagogy the method ceases to be an instrument by which the teachers (in this instance, the revolutionary leadership) can manipulate the students (in this instance, the oppressed), because it expresses the consciousness of the students themselves.

A revolutionary leadership must accordingly practice *co-intentional* education. Teachers and students (leadership and people), co-intent on reality, are both Subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality, and thereby coming to know it critically, but in the task of re-creating that knowledge. As they attain this knowledge of reality through common reflection and action, they discover themselves as its permanent re-creators. In this way, the presence of the oppressed in the struggle for their liberation will be what it should be: not pseudo-participation, but committed involvement.

Justification for a Humanizing Pedagogy: Lesson's from Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed

A number of scenarios unfold from Kenya's efforts towards liberty that could benefit from Paulo Freire's call for a humanizing pedagogy in order to address oppression. These are discussed as follows:

Oppressed turns Oppressor

Freire (2005) observed that almost always the oppressed, instead of striving for liberation; tend themselves to become oppressors, or sub-oppressors.

The very structure of their thought has been conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped. Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors. This is their model of humanity. This phenomenon derives from the fact that the oppressed, at a certain moment of their existential experience, adopt an attitude of "adhesion" to the oppressor. Under these circumstances they cannot "consider" him sufficiently clearly to objectivize him—to discover him "outside" themselves. In this Freire says that:

This does not necessarily mean that the oppressed are unaware that they are downtrodden. But their perception of themselves as oppressed is impaired by their submersion in the reality of oppression. At this level, their perception of themselves as opposites of the oppressor does not yet signify engagement in a struggle to overcome the contradiction; the one pole aspires not to liberation, but to identification with its opposite pole. (...) It is not to become free that they want agrarian reform, but in order to acquire land and thus become landowners. (Freire, ibid)

According to CIPEV report, violence was part and parcel of the colonial state, which used it to ensure control in Kenya. After independence, President Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot and the stick to maintain power, with the use of violence mainly concentrated in the hands of the State, rather than outside of it. For a variety of reasons, repression under Kenya's second President, Daniel arap Moi, became more draconian. First he did not start off with the same array of resources (e.g. land, civil service jobs, and a buoyant coffee boom) available to Kenyatta to reward his supporters and the general public. Second, in 1982, he experienced an attempted coup against him. This followed an unsuccessful attempt to keep him from becoming the President. For both reasons and perhaps for others, violence, including detentions without trial and the routine torture of perceived and real dissenters, became institutionalized early on under Moi's rule. This in turn generated a groundswell of dissent against his rule by a growing opposition movement, including politicians, lawyers, students, and others from all parts of the country.

Under the amended Constitution, to win the presidency, President Moi needed to win his parliamentary seat, obtain a majority of the votes cast in the country, and receive 25% of the votes cast in five provinces. Various reports covering elections held during this period alleged that high ranking political figures, civil servants, and others close to the heart of the Government organized and used violent gangs to intimidate people in areas of potential opposition support.

The strategy was to keep opposition supporters from voting and the means used was to hire gangs in the Rift Valley and elsewhere to kill people and displace individuals from their home areas so that KAMATUSA candidates could win and President Moi could be assured of obtaining 25% of the vote in five provinces, the majority of the votes cast for the President, and the majority of elected Members of Parliament. In short, violence became a means of securing political power and winning elections (CIPEV, n.d:26).

Gangs and militias continued to proliferate all over the country, thereby increasing the presence of institutionalized extra-state violence both during and after elections, a pattern that continued to increase up through the 2007 elections, even after President Mwai Kibaki took over power in 2002.

(...) Political gangs continued to sell their services of violence on a willing buyer willing seller basis (...) (CIPEV, n.d:26).

Even following the election of Kibaki in 2002 still rules were ignored within Ministries leading to financial scandals such as Anglo Leasing and others underscoring the once again the fact that the personal power of the President and his close associates trumped the law. Individuals in various parts of Government whether in the civil service, the judiciary, and even in Parliament, understand that, irrespective of the laws, the executive arm of government determines what happens. Hence, the State is not seen as neutral but as the preserve of those in power.

The attempt to reduce the personal power that had been accumulated by former President Moi initially was the reason opposition forces sought to introduce the post of Prime Minister. This culminated in an informal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) before the 2002 election between the then opposition coalition under which the coalition agreed to introduce the post of Prime Minister after the election. Once elected, however, President Kibaki reneged on the MoU.

As soon as the MoU was scuttled, a group led by Raila Odinga left the coalition Government. President's Kibaki Government was perceived as being unwilling to abide by its pre-election agreement with its partners and as retreating into an ethnic enclave (...) Even though the MoU was not a legal agreement, the Kibaki Government's turning away from it and removing from government the group of Ministers associated to Odinga had the effect of increasing the polarization of politics along ethnic lines (...) With the ethnic political fault lines clearly drawn after 2005, and the need to win the presidency seen as paramount, tensions began to mount. (CIPEV, n.d:30).

The events that have unfolded in Kenya's political history show a case where the oppressed turns into the oppressor anytime there is a change of political regime. As Freire (2005), it is here that Kenyans must first critically recognize the causes of oppression in the country so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity.

An unjust social order

Freire (2005) teaches that any attempt to "soften" the power of the oppressor in deference to the weakness of the oppressed almost always manifests itself in the form of false generosity. In order to have the continued opportunity to express their "generosity," the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent fount of this "generosity," which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is why the dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its source. True generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy the causes which nourish false charity. False charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the "rejects of life," to extend their trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so that these hands—whether of individuals or entire peoples—need be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they become human hands which work and, working, transform the world.

From CIPEV and Akiwumi report, it is shown that:

(...) politicians as the organizers of the violence and killing for political ends, and noted that the warriors and gangs of youth who took action were both paid and pressed into service. Aside from this youths were sometimes Promised Land and jobs after evicting up country dwellers. However, it is not clear if they got either(CIPEV, n.d:26).

Likewise CIPEV reports that after independence, President Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot and the stick to maintain power in which individual members of the opposition were weaned back to the fold through appointments to Government positions, and allocations of land as well as provision of other perks. To consolidate his base after becoming the President, Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin, through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and the military. Rightly or wrongly, these individuals given these were viewed by President Moi's opponents as not qualified or competent.

Even following the election of Kibaki in 2002 still rules were ignored within Ministries leading to financial scandals such as Anglo Leasing and others underscoring the once again the fact that the personal power of the President and his close associates trumped the law. Individuals in various parts of Government whether in the civil service, the judiciary, and even in Parliament, understand that, irrespective of the laws, the executive arm of government determines what happens. The attempt to reduce the personal power that had been accumulated by former President Moi initially was the reason opposition forces sought to introduce the post of Prime Minister. This culminated in an informal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) before the 2002 election between the then opposition coalition under which the coalition agreed to introduce the post of Prime Minister after the election. Once elected, however, President Kibaki reneged on the MoU.

In this unjust social order, Kenya could learn from Freire's observation that submerged in reality, the oppressed cannot perceive clearly the "order" which serves the interests of the oppressors whose image they have internalized. Chafing under the restrictions of this order, they often manifest a type of horizontal violence, striking out at their own comrades for the pettiest reasons. At a certain point in their existential experience the oppressed feel an irresistible attraction towards the oppressors and their way of life. Sharing this way of life becomes an overpowering aspiration. In their alienation, the oppressed want at any cost to resemble the oppressors, to imitate them, to follow them.

A Humanizing Pedagogy for Kenya

From the situations of political violence in Kenya and Freire's conceptualization of a humanizing pedagogy coupled with the orientation of oppressor-oppressed relationship, a framework of political engagements could endeavoured towards the true liberation of Kenyans. Such a pedagogy could form an instrument for Kenyans critical discovery that both oppressed and their oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization. For politicians and the general people of Kenya to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. According to Freire (2005) this perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the motivating force for liberating action. Nor does the discovery by the oppressed that they exist in dialectical relationship to the oppressor, as his antithesis—that without them the oppressor could not exist—in itself constitute liberation. The oppressed can overcome the contradiction in which they are caught only when this perception enlists them in the struggle to free themselves.

As Freire (2005) points out, Kenyans need know that:

One of the gravest obstacles to the achievement of liberation is that oppressive reality absorbs those within it and thereby acts to submerge human beings consciousness. Functionally, oppression is domesticating. To no longer be prey to its force, one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. (...) A mere perception of reality not followed by this critical intervention will not lead to a transformation of objective reality—precisely because it is not a true perception. This is the case of a purely subjectivist perception by someone who forsakes objective reality and creates a false substitute. (Freire, *ibid*)

Those who commit to liberation efforts in Kenya need understand a pedagogy animated by authentic, humanist (not humanitarian) generosity, presents itself as a pedagogy of humankind. Pedagogy which begins with the egoistic interests of the oppressors (an egoism cloaked in the false generosity of paternalism) and makes of the oppressed the objects of its humanitarianism, itself maintains and embodies oppression. It is an instrument of dehumanization. In this regard, Freire (2005) teaches that:

The pedagogy of the first stage must deal with the problem of the oppressed consciousness and the oppressor consciousness, the problem of men and women who oppress and men and women who suffer oppression. It must take into account their behavior, their view of the world, and their ethics. A particular problem is the duality of the oppressed: they are contradictory, divided beings, shaped by and existing in a concrete situation of oppression and violence. (...) It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors. The latter, as an oppressive class, can free neither others nor themselves. It is therefore essential that the oppressed wage the struggle to resolve the contradiction in which they are caught; and the contradiction will be resolved by the appearance of the new man: neither oppressor nor oppressed, but man in the process of liberation. If the goal of the oppressed is to become fully human, they will not achieve their goal by merely reversing the terms of the contradiction, by simply changing poles. (Freire, *ibid*)

It is has been shown in this paper that each new political regime has continued the practice of oppression. Here, Kenyans could learn from Freire's advice that the moment the new regime hardens into a dominating bureaucracy the humanist dimension of the struggle is lost and it is no longer possible to speak of liberation. Freire (2005) says that:

(...) the authentic solution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction does not lie in a mere reversal of position, in moving from one pole to the other. Nor does it lie in the replacement of the former oppressors with new ones who continue to subjugate the oppressed—all in the name of their liberation. (Freire, *ibid*)

Kenyans who authentically commit themselves to the people must re-examine themselves constantly. According to Freire (2005) this conversion is so radical as not to allow of ambiguous behavior. To affirm this commitment but to consider oneself the proprietor of revolutionary wisdom—which must then be given to (or imposed on) the people—is to retain the old ways. Freire (2005) advices that:

The man or woman who proclaims devotion to the cause of liberation yet is unable to enter into *communion* with the people, whom he or she continues to regard as totally ignorant, is grievously self-deceived. The convert who approaches the people but feels alarm at each step they take, each doubt they express, and each suggestion they offer, and attempts to impose his "status," remains nostalgic towards his origins. (Freire, *ibid*)

As Freire (2005) teaches, critical and liberating dialogue, which presupposes action, must be carried on with the oppressed at whatever the stage of their struggle for liberation. The content of that dialogue can and should vary in accordance with historical conditions and the level at which the oppressed perceive reality. Kenyans need to know that to substitute monologue, slogans, and communiques for dialogue is to attempt to liberate the oppressed with the instruments of domestication. Freire (2005) cautions that:

Attempting to liberate the oppressed without their reflective participation in the act of liberation is to treat them as objects which must be saved from a burning building; it is to lead them into the populist pitfall and transform them into masses which can be manipulated. (Freire, *ibid*)

It is essential that Kenyans trust those who stand up to share their oppressive conditions. Freire (2005) teaches that it is necessary to trust in the oppressed and in their ability to reason. Whoever lacks this trust will fail to initiate (or will abandon) dialogue, reflection, and communication, and will fall into using slogans, communiques, monologues, and instructions. Superficial conversions to the cause of liberation carry this danger. Political action on the side of the oppressed must be pedagogical action in the authentic sense of the word, and, therefore, action *with* the oppressed. Those who work for liberation must not take advantage of the emotional dependence of the oppressed—dependence that is the fruit of the concrete situation of domination which surrounds them and which engendered their unauthentic view of the world. Using their dependence to create still greater dependence is an oppressor tactic. Freire (2005) cautions that:

Libertarian action must recognize this dependence as a weak point and must attempt through reflection and action to transform it into independence. However, not even the best-intentioned leadership can bestow independence as a gift. The liberation of the oppressed is a liberation of women and men, not things. Accordingly, while no one liberates himself by his own efforts alone, neither is he liberated by others. Liberation, a human phenomenon, cannot be achieved by semi-humans. Any attempt to treat people as semi-humans only dehumanizes them. When people are already dehumanized, due to the oppression they suffer, the process of their liberation must not employ the methods of dehumanization. (Freire, *ibid*)

The correct method for a revolutionary leadership lies in dialogue. The conviction of the oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary leadership, but the result of their own conscience. This way, revolutionary leaders in Kenya must realize that their own conviction of the necessity for struggle was not given to them by anyone else—if it is authentic. This conviction cannot be packaged and sold; it is reached, rather, by means of a totality of reflection and action. Likewise, the oppressed (who do not commit themselves to the struggle unless they are convinced, and who, if they do not make such a commitment, withhold the indispensable conditions for this struggle) must reach this conviction as Subjects, not as objects. They also must intervene critically in the situation which surrounds them and whose mark they bear; propaganda cannot achieve this. While the conviction of the necessity for struggle is indispensable to the revolutionary leadership it is also necessary for the oppressed. Freire (2005) points out that:

A revolutionary leadership must accordingly practice co-intentional education. Teachers and students (leadership and people), co-intent on reality, are both Subjects, not only in the task of unveiling that reality, and thereby coming to know it critically, but in the task of re-creating that knowledge. As they attain this knowledge of reality through common reflection and action, they discover themselves as its permanent re-creators. In this way, the presence of the oppressed in the struggle for their liberation will be what it should be: not pseudo-participation, but committed involvement (Freire, *ibid*).

Conclusions

Based on its discussions, this paper concludes that struggle to end oppressive political regimes in Kenya is not obtaining because of lack of genuine revolutionary leaders. Those who make efforts towards change only renege on it when they get into power. In short, the oppressed become the oppressor. The political elite in Kenya are therefore in need of a humanizing pedagogy. This pedagogy would make them fully committed to the course of action that is fully human and endeavoured by the Kenyan people.

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